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To a labor economist or an industrial organization economist, a family looks like "a
little factory." To a bargaining theorist, a husband and wife are "two agents in a relation of
bilateral monopoly." To an urban economist or a public choice theorist, a family looks like
"a little city", or perhaps " a little club". To a welfare economist, a family is an association
of benevolently interrelated individuals. Each of these analogies suggests useful ways in
which the standard tools of neoclassical economics can aid in understanding the workings
of a family.
The first section of this review draws on the analogies to a little factory and to a little
city. It explores the theory of household technology and the household utility possibility
frontier. The second section concerns decision theory within the household. This discussion
applies standard consumer decision theory as well as bargaining theory and the theory of
public choice. The third section of this paper deals with family formation and the choice of
mates. This theory is analogous to "Tiebout theory" in urban economics, where the objects
of choice include not only the public goods supplied in each city, but which individuals
live together. An aspect of family life that has fewer parallels in the economics of market
economies is intrafamilial love and altruism. The final section of this paper reviews a
growing theoretical literature on love, altruism and the family.
Section I. Household Technology and Utility Possibility Frontiers
I.1. Household Production Functions
In his Treatise on the Family, Gary Becker (1981) emphasizes the importance of di-
vision of labor and gains from specialization. Drawing on his 1965 paper, "A Theory of
the Allocation of Time", Becker endows households with household production functions
which describe the possibilities for producing "household commodities". Becker's house-
hold commodities are nonmarket goods that are the outputs of production processes that
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use market goods and the labor time of household members as inputs. His examples of
household commodities include "children, prestige and envy, health, and pleasures of the
senses." He suggests that the number of household commodities is typically much smaller
than the number of market goods.
The concept of production function, borrowed from the theory of the firm, has been
a fruitful source of insight into the workings of families. Becker exploits this analogy
as he examines such issues as specialization within the household, comparative advantage,
returns to scale, factor substitution, human capital and assortative mating. Each individual
in Becker's household can use time either for household labor or market labor. The family
can purchase market goods and either consume them directly or use them as inputs into
household production.
Robert Pollak and Michael Wachter (1975) develop the formal structure of Becker's
household production model and show that if household commodities are produced with
constant returns to scale and no joint production, then "shadow prices" for these com-
modities are determined by the prices of market goods and the wage rates for market
labor-independently of the quantities demanded. This means that the household's pro-
duction possibility set, like an ordinary competitive budget set, has a linear boundary
with marginal rates of transformation that are independent of the quantities chosen.
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production possibility sets have this property, then the household production model allows
a neat separation of production and consumption activities. Pollak and Wachter observe
that with joint production or with nonconstant returns to scale, this separation of pro-
duction and consumption is lost since the shadow prices of commodities depends on the
quantities produced and the boundary of the production possibility set is "curved." Pollak
and Wachter argue that unless the production of "household commodities" permits sepa-
ration of production and consumption activities, there is little to be gained from adding
unobservable household commodities to the model. Instead they recommend studying
the demand for market goods and leisure directly as functions of wages and the prices of
1 This result is essentially the generalized Samuelson nonsubstitution theorem for the "small-country
case" where factors can be purchased at constant prices. See Samuelson (1961) and Varian (1984).
market goods. Pollak and Wachter also maintain that tastes and technology are likely to
be confounded by treating non-measurable aggregate variables such as "child quality" as
commodities. They recommend more narrowly-defined child-related commodities such as
"scores on standardized tests" or "number of dental cavities."
As Pollak and Wachter point out, even with very general technologies, there will be
well-defined demand functions for market goods and supply functions of labor which could
in principle be determined from household utility. Trout Rader (1964) establishes general
conditions under which "induced preferences" for trades inherit such properties as con-
vexity, continuity and homogeneity from the production functions and the preferences for
produced produced commodities. Richard Muth (1966) shows that even if the output of
a household commodity is not directly observable, the assumption that this commodity is
produced with constant returns to scale can have interesting testable implications. If for
example, two or more market goods are used as inputs for this good and no other goods,
then it must be that the income elasticities of demand for the two goods will be identical.
A detailed discussion of the theory of household production and additional references can
be found in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980).
1.2. Household Public Goods
A unit of private goods consumed by one person cannot be consumed by another.
But some goods, such as living space, household heating and lighting and shared automo-
bile trips are jointly consumed and are best modelled as local public goods which enter
simultaneously into the utility functions of all family members.
While Becker (1981) did not explicitly distinguish household public goods from private
goods, his household technology model could certainly be used to describe production of
household public goods as well as ordinary private goods. Marilyn Manser and Murray
Brown (1980) and Marjorie McElroy and Mary Homey (1981) were among the first to
introduce household public goods as an integral part of their models of family behavior.
These authors emphasize the benefits of shared public goods as a reason that marriage
yields a utility surplus over living separately. Yoram Weiss and Robert Willis (1985),
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in their economic study of divorce and child-support payments, treat the well-being of
children as a household public good that enters the utility of both parents whether these
parents are married or divorced. David Lam (1988) suggests that the presence of household
public goods will favor positive assortative mating by income.
Household public goods are modelled as follows. Consider a household with h members.
Each household member i has a utility function U,(x;, y) where x is the vector of private
goods consumed by i and where y is the vector of household public goods. A household
allocation is a vector (z 1 ,... , xa,y) that specifies the consumption of private goods by each
household member and the vector of household public goods. The household budget and
household technology determine a household production possibility set S which specifies all
possible aggregate consumptions of public and private goods for the household. A feasible
allocation for the household is an allocation (zi,... , x1, y) such that (x, y) E S, where
x = E:ix,..
UP(y). In general, the conditional utility possibility frontiers corresponding to different
public goods vectors may cross each other. The utility possibility frontier for the household
will be the outer envelope of the conditional utility possibility frontiers corresponding to
all feasible choices of y.
Examples of utility possibility frontiers for households with public goods
Example 1. A household has two members. There is one private good and one household
public good. Total household income is $3. The quantity of the household public good
must be either zero or one unit. The price of the private good is $1 per unit and the cost
of a unit of the public good is $2. Person 1 has utility function Ui(X 1, Y) = X,(Y + 1)
and Person 2 has utility function U 2(X 2 , Y) = X2 (Y + 1)2.
1.3. The Household Utility Possibility Frontier rp"um1
Y=
The utility possibility frontier is an analytic tool that illuminates many issues in the
theory of the family.
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Consider a household with h members and a household production
possibility set S. To each feasible allocation (xi,... , za, y), corresponds a distribution of
utilities among household members in which person i gets utility U,(x1, y). The set of
all utility distributions that can be constructed in this way is called the utility possibility
set. The "upper" boundary of the utility possibility set is known as the utility possibility
frontier. By construction, the utility possibility frontier consists of all utility distributions
that are Pareto optimal for the household.
For any fixed vector y of public goods, it is possible to construct a conditional utility
possibility set UP(y), such that UP(y) corresponds to all of the distributions of utility
that can be achieved by some feasible allocation in which the vector of public goods is
y The conditional utility possibility frontier corresponding to y is the upper boundary of
2 The utility possibility frontier seems to have been introduced to the economic literature by Paul




If Y = 0, then U1 = X1 and U2 = X2. Since in this case, the household bud-
get constraint is X1 + X 2 = 3, the conditional utility possibility set UP(0) is the set
{(U1, U2)|U + U2 <3}. In Figure 1, UP(0) is bounded by the line CD.
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If Y = 1, then U1 = 2X1 and U2 = 4X1. Since the household budget constraint is now
X1 + X2 = 3-2 = 1, the utility possibility set UP(1) is the set {(U1 ,U2)|jU 1 +}U 2 < 1}.
This is the set bounded by the line AB in Figure 1.
The utility possibility set for the household is the union of the sets UP(0) and UP(1),
and the household utility possibility frontier is the thick broken line running from A to
E to D. Notice that in this example, some Pareto optimal allocations for the household
are achieved by supplying no household public goods and others are achieved by supplying
one unit of household public goods.
Example 2. A household has two members. There is one private good and one household
public good. Total income available to the household is $10. The price of private goods
is $1 per unit and the price of public goods is $1 per unit. The household can choose any
allocation (XI, X2, Y) > 0 such that X1 + X2 + Y < 10. Person 1 has the utility function
U1(Xi, Y) = X 1 + Y/
2 and Person 2 has the utility function has the utility function
U2(X 21Y) = X2 + 3Y
1 /2.
An allocation in which both consumers consume positive amounts of the private good
will be Pareto optimal if and only if the sum of their marginal rates of substitution be-
tween public and private goods equals the price ratio of public to private goods. (This is
sometimes known as the Samuelson condition, in honor of Samuelson's (1954) construc-
tion of the theory of public goods.) This condition implies that jY- 1/ 2 + Y2-1/2 = 1 or
equivalently that V = 4. Therefore the set of Pareto optimal allocations in which both
household members have positive consumption of private goods consists of all allocations
(X 1,X 2 ,4) > 0such that Xi+X 2 = 10 -4 = 6. When Y = 4, it must be that U = X 1 +2
and U2 = X2 6. Therefore along the part of the utility possibility frontier correspond-
ing to allocations where both consume positive amounts of private good, it must be that
U1 + U2 = X1 + X2 ±8. Since for these allocations, X1 + X2 = 6, it follows that this part
of the utility possibility frontier lies on the U, + U2 = 14. If both consumers are consuming
positive amounts of the public good, then it is also true that U1 > 2 and U2 > 6. Therefore
the part of the utility possibility frontier corresponding to positive consumption of private
goods for both household members is the line segment BC in Figure 2. There are other
Pareto allocations where only one of the consumers consumes positive amounts of private
goods. These allocations correspond to the curved lines AB and CD in Figure 2. At these
points, the Samuelson conditions do not apply and the amount of public good supplied is
less than 4 units. This part of the story is explained in detail by Bergstrom and Comes
(1983) and and by Campbell and Truchon (1988).
Fipka 2
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In Example 2 all Pareto optima such that both consumers have positive consumption of
private goods must have the'same output of public good. Moreover, for all such allocations,
the utility possibility frontier is a straight line. Every Pareto optimal household allocation
has the property that (X1, X2, Y) could be found by maximizing the sum of utilities,
U (X,,Y) + U2(X2, Y), subject to the household feasibility constraint X1 + X2 + Y = 10.
1.4. Transferable Utility in the Household
The term "transferable utility" seems to have originated in game theory, but the idea
that it represents is familiar to all economists. Roughly speaking, transferable utility
means that utility can be "redistributed ", like apples or bananas. If one distribution of
utility is possible then so is any other distribution of utilities where individual utilities sum
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to the same number. The assumption of transferable utility has powerful and interesting
implications in the the theory of the household. Therefore it is worthwhile to investigate
this assumption carefully.3
Our rough definition of transferable utility needs to be extended and clarified. One
issue arises in Example 2, where the utility possibility frontier is not a straight line over
its entire range, but is a straight line for all utility allocations that are achieved with a
positive amount of private good for each consumer. Since this is the part of the utility
possibility frontier that is relevant for most analysis, economists usually include define
transferable utility to include cases like Example 2, where the utility where the utility
possibility frontier linear is linear over the "relevant" range of utility distributions.
Another, more subtle aspect of the definition needs clarification. For the utility func-
tions that are specified in Example 1, the utility possibility frontier is not a straight line,
but it would be possible to make a monotonic transformation of each person's utility in
such a way that with the new utility representation, the utility possibility frontier is a
straight line. In fact this is possible whenever the utility possibility frontier is downward-
sloping.' Transferable utility becomes a non-trivial property when we assume that a utility
function can be found for each consumer such that the utility possibility frontier is linear
for all family budget constraints within some broad class of budgets. In Example 1, it is
possible to find utility representations of each person's preferences so that there is a linear
utility possibility frontier when household wealth is 3. But with this utility function, when
household wealth is 4, the utility possibility frontier would once again have a kink.
3 The domain of applicability of transferable utility is not as widely understood as it should be. Some
economists and game theorists think there is more transferable utility than there really is and some think
there is less. Some believe that transferable utility obtains whenever preferences are continuous and
there exists a divisible and fully exchangeable good that is desired by all consumers. Others believe that
transferable utility applies only in the very special case of "quasilinear utility", where utility is linear in
the quantity of some commodity. As we will show, neither view is correct.
4 Consider any utility possibility frontier in the positive orthant, defined by an equation U3 = F(U ),
where F is a strictly decreasing function. Define the functions gi(U) = and gs(U) =UF .
The functions gi and gs are well-defined and strictly monotone increasing. Let V1 (z) = gi(U1 (z)) and
V2(z) = g9 (U2 (z)). Then the Vj's are increasing transformations of the U's, and for the utility possibility
frontier with utilities measured by the functions V is described by V(z) + V 2(z) = 1.
For the utility functions in Example 2, the linear portion of the utility possibility
frontier is described by an equation of the form U1 + U2 = C. This is true for all prices
and family incomes. Changes in prices or in family income is will change only the constant
C, causing a parallel shift of the linear utility possibility frontier. Thus Example 2 has
transferable utility and in Example 1 does not.
Tansferable Utility with Private Goods- Hicksian and Gorman Aggregation
The simplest example of a household with transferable utility is a household with two
selfish people, one private good and no public goods. Then preferences can be represented
by the utility function U(zi) = x, where z is i's consumption of the private good. If the
household has a fixed wealth W and the price of the good is 1, then the utility possibility
frontier is just the set of vectors (U1, U2 ) such that U1 + U2 = W. Changes in household
wealth would shift this utility possibility frontier in a parallel fashion, but it would remain
a straight line.
The single-private-good model is more general than may first appear. If the only
goods consumed are marketable private goods, then the "Hicks composite commodity
theorem" allows one to model the household as if there were just one good, "wealth".
The composite commodity theorem can even accommodate household labor supply if each
household member is a price-taker in the labor market. This can be done with the usual
trick of treating each person i's leisure as a commodity which is marketable at some price
wi. Total household income includes the value of each person's potential amount of leisure
evaluated at that person's wage. Individuals are allocated shares of total household income
and are able to "buy" their leisure at the market wage. Therefore if the relative prices of
private goods are assumed constant throughout the analysis and if there are no household
public goods, there is no loss of generality in assuming transferable utility.
If one wants to analyze the responses of households to changes in relative prices, then
it is no longer possible to appeal to Hicks aggregation as a justification for transferable
utility. But there is an interesting special class of preferences for which the utility possibility
frontier is linear and changes in prices induce parallel shifts of the utility possibility frontier.
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Bergstrom and Hal Varian (1985) showed that in a pure exchange economy with private
goods and convex preferences, there is transferable utility if and only if preferences of all
individuals can be represented by indirect utility of the Gorman polar form. Indirect utility
is of the Gorman polar form if it can be expressed in the form V,(p, m;) = a(p)m; + 3#(p)
for each individual i for some function a(p) and functions f3l(p).
If indirect utility is of the Gorman polar form, then the income-consumption paths of
all consumers are parallel straight lines, the slopes and intercepts of which may depend
on prices. (See Gorman (1953)). Therefore aggregate demand is unchanged by income
redistribution and is the same as it would be if all income were in the hands of a single
consumer.
The Gorman class includes preferences represented by a quasilinear direct utility func-
tion of the form U(ri, x2,... , z) = x + f(x 2,... , z,,). For many applications, quasilin-
earity is an unsatisfactory assumption, since if preferences are quasilinear, the demand for
all goods except for good 1 is independent of income. But the Gorman class also includes
identical homothetic preferences and more generally, preferences which, like the Stone-
Geary utility function, are represented by utility functions of the form U(x - e;), where
U is a homogeneous function and e, is some vector that "displaces the origin" and which
may be different for different people. Thus it is possible to have transferable utility, but
to have preferences differing among individuals and to have income-responsive demand for
all goods.
In the Pollak-Wachter model cited above, there is transferable utility in a household
that produces non-market goods. The assumptions needed for this result are that house-
hold production occurs with single-output production functions and constant returns to
scale and that no more than one non-marketed commodity is used as an input. With
these assumptions, there exist "shadow prices" for the produced household commodities.
These shadow prices are determined by technology and the price of marketable goods,
independently of the quantities demanded. With this setup, transferable utility is guaran-
teed by the same assumptions on preferences that have been discussed for the case where
all consumption goods are marketable. If, on the other hand, there are nonconstant re-
turns to scale in household production or if there is more than one nonmarketable (and
nonproduced) input, there will typically not be transferable utility.
Transferable Utility with Household Public Goods
Example 1 shows that if there are household public goods, there might not be transferable
utility, even if there is only one private good. There is, however, a useful special class of
preferences over private and public goods for which there is transferable utility. This class
bears a neat duality to preferences of the Gorman polar form. Recall that the Gorman polar
form requires that indirect utility be representable in the form V(p, mi) = a(p)m +#I3 (p).
Bergstrom and Cornes (1981, 1983) found that a necessary and sufficient condition for
transferable utility when there is one private good and n public goods is that preferences of
each household member are representable by a direct utility function of the form U,(x,, y) =
f(y)r. +gi(y), where x; is the amount of the private good received by person i and y is
the n-vector of public goods in the household. One special case is the quasilinear utility
representation, Ui(xi, y) = xi + fi(y) (see, for instance Example 2 .) In this example, a
consumer's willingness to pay for public goods is independent of his income. But there are
also examples in this class of utility functions where willingness to pay depends on income.
For example, let each consumer i have a utility function of the generalized Cobb-Douglas
form U.(x;, y) = xi(y + b;)c where c > 0 and where the b;'s are arbitrary constants.
The Bergstrom-Cornes result can be combined with the Bergstrom-Varian results on
transferable utility with several private goods to characterize transferable utility when
there is any number of private goods and any number of public goods. Let us define an
eztended indirect utility function with public goods in the same way that indirect utility is
defined when there are no public goods except that utility depends on the amount of public
goods as well as on the price vector and on income. Define V(p, mi, y) be the maximum
of U,(z,y) subject to the constraint that pxz = mi. It can be shown that there will be
transferable utility in a household if and only if this indirect utility function is of the form
V(pmiy) = c(p, Y)m, I+ 3 (p).
The utility possibility frontiers in households where utility is of the Bergstrom-Comes
10 11
have the following properties:
" The conditional utility possibility frontiers UPF(y) and UPF(y'), corresponding to
any two different quantities of public goods y and y' will not cross each other. One of
these two frontiers lies strictly to the northeast of the other.
" The utility possibility frontier is a straight line segment with slope -1. All points on
the utility possibility frontier that correspond to interior Pareto optima are achieved
with the same amount of public goods, y = y*. The end points of the utility possibility
frontier correspond to the two utility distributions in which one consumer gets x*=.
W - py* units of private goods the other gets no private goods.
Transferable Utility and Mate Selection
An important conceptual building block for economic theories of marriage is the utility
possibility frontier that any couple would face if they were to marry each other. Lloyd
Shapley and Martin Shubik (1972) and Becker (1974) suggested that this problem could
be modeled as a linear programming assignment problem. The linear programming as-
signment model requires that there be transferable utility within each possible marriage.
Here we explore the degree of generality that can be accommodated by transferable utility
within this framework.
The notion of household public goods is well-suited for analyzing the issues of compat-
ibility that arise in possible marriages. The public goods model of course applies to such
jointly consumed household commodities as heat, light, and a well-tended garden. It is
also suitable to the many important joint decisions that a married couple must make. If
two people marry each other, they must marry on the same date. They must also agree
about where to live, how many children to have, how to educate their children and what
size of estate to leave them. Each of these variables can be modeled as a pure public good
that enters the utility function of both partners.
Suppose that male i marries female j and they they choose private consumption Xi
for him, X; for her, and the vector Y of household public goods. Assume that their
utility functions are of the following functional form: U, = A(Y)X, + Bi(Y, j) and U, =
12
A(Y)X, + B,(Y, i).
These utility functions indicate three things a person must consider when he or she
contemplates a potential marriage: (i) the vector Y of public choices that would be made
in this marriage, (ii) the amount of private goods that he or she would get to consume
in that marriage, and (iii) his or her feelings about the intrinsic desirability of the other
person as a marriage partner. The third effect is registered by the fact that the functions
Bi(Y, j) and B,(Y, i) depend not only on Y but also on who one has as a partner.
The consumption options available to a potential pair of spouses depend on their joint
economic productivity. In particular, let Fi,(Y) be the total amount of private good that
would be available to male i and female j if they chose to have the vector Y of household
public goods. (The function F,(Y) would incorporate the effect on the household budget
of public goods that must be purchased. It could also include the effects of household public
goods that influence household income, like location or education of household members.)
The set of affordable combinations of private consumptions and public choices is the set
of vectors (Xi, X,, Y) which satisfy the equation: X; + X, < F,,(Y).
In this case, for any couple, i and j, the part of the utility possibility frontier corre-
sponding to allocations where both persons get positive consumptions of private goods is
described by the linear equation U, + U1 = Ai, where A,, is the maximum of: A(Y)X +
B,(Y, j) + B;(Y, i) subject to the constraint X < F;3(Y). In this case, the problem of
finding Pareto efficient allocations within a potential marriage reduces to a constrained
maximization problem in the aggregate quantities X and Y. If they were to marry, there
would be transferable utility between any pair i and j, with utility possibility frontier for
this pair consisting of utilities that add to Ai,.
Section II. Decision-Making in the Family
After proving that in general there do not exist "social indifference curves" that ratio-
nalize aggregate demand, Samuelson (1956) worries that
" But haven't I in a sense proved too much? Who after all is the consumer
in the theory of consumer's (not consumers') behavior? Is he a bachelor? A
spinster? Or is he a "spending unit" as defined by statistical ollsters and
recorders of budgetary spending? In most of the cultures actually studied by
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modern economists, the fundamental unit on the demand side is clearly the
"family" and this consists of a single individual in but a fraction of cases."
Economists are not the only social scientists to be concerned about whether the family
should be treated as a decision-making agent. The issue is nicely posed by the sociologist,
James Coleman (1990, page 580):
" The family has always been an entity within which multiple activities are
carried out: economic production, joint consumption, procreation, socializa-
tion of children, and leisure pursuits. Generally it cannot be regarded as a
purposive actor ... for it cannot usually be described as having a purpose for
which it acts. It is, like society as a whole but on a smaller scale, a system
of action composed of purposive actors in relation. Yet in some capacities
the family may be usefully regarded as a purposive actor for it is an entity
in terms of whose perceived interests natural persons act; for example some
persons say they are acting to "uphold the honor of the family." And in
some cases a family does act as a unit, to attain ends that can be described
as purposes or goals of the family.
It may be useful to clarify when and for what purposes a system of actions
should be called an actor. For example, in a swarm of insects hovering in
the summer air, each insect is darting this way and that, apparently either
randomly or in pursuit of its own ends. But the swarm as a whole will move
this way or that, hover expand or contract, and then fly off no less coherently
than if it were a single organism.... Thus just as a swarm of insects maa be
considered an actor, the family may-sometimes-be considered an actor.
11.1. Unitary Theories of Family Decision Making
At least until recently, empirical studies of household demand have routinely assumed
that a family acts as if it were maximizing a "family utility function"." That they should
have done so is understandable since most of the available cross-sectional data on household
consumption consists of household aggregates which do not distinguish either the incomes
nor the consumptions of individual family members. The reservations that Samuelson
(1956) raised about this approach were amplified by the work of Manser and Brown (1980)
and McElroy and Horney (1981), who showed that if the allocation of resources within
the family is determined by Nash bargaining, then household aggregate demand functions
cannot in general be rationalized by maximization of a family utility function.
Theories in which household demand can be rationalized by a family utility function
have at various times been called "single-agent", "common preference ", "consensus",
s Good surveys of this work can be found in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Browning (1992).
"altruistic", or "benevolent dictator" theories.6 We follow the suggestion of Chiappori,
Haddad, Hoddinott, and Kanbur (1992) in designating this class of models as unitary
models. This name is sufficiently broad to encompass the several different models of family
structure that predict that a family's aggregate behavior is "as if" it is maximizing a family
utility function.
Unitary Models with Transferable Utility
Consider a household with private goods but no public goods, where indirect utility func-
tions are of the Gorman polar form. If each family member is given an income and all
face the same competitive prices, then total amount of each good consumed by household
members is determined by prices and total family income. Changes in the way that income
is distributed within the household would have no effect on total household consumption.
Gorman (1953) described this situation as the presence of "community preference fields".
In this case, household demand can be rationalized as maximizing the utility of a single
consumer. Suppose that an econometrician had access to a time series of commodity prices
and to this household's time path of total income and total consumption, but could not
observe consumption by individual household members. The econometrician would not be
able to reject the hypothesis that all household decisions were made by a single rational
consumer (who spends the entire household budget on himself).
Conversely, if preferences are not of the Gorman form, total household consumption
will, in general, depend on the distribution of income within the household. Therefore if
changes in the distribution of household income occur during the course of the time series,
6 Some economists refer to single-agent theories of the family as the "neoclassical theory of the fam-
ily". Pierre-Andre Chiappori (1992) suggests that this is not an appropriate name. Although neoclassical
economists sometimes treat the family as a single maximizing agent, more pluralistic theories of the fam-
ily fall squarely within the neoclassical tradition. A distinctive feature of neoclassical microeconomics
is "methodological individualism". When faced with fundamental questions about group behavior, neo-
classical economists typically take a reductionist approach that seeks to explain group behavior not as a
choice of a single rational agent, but rather as the result of the interplay of actions by group members with
distinct objectives. It is true that neoclassical economists such as Gorman (1953), Samuelson (196), and
Becker(19T4) have explored special assumptions on preferences under which families act as maximizing
agents. It is also true that econometricians have often tried to simplify the task of applying neoclassical
theory to household data by assuming that they act like a single agent. But this does not mean that the
natural course of neoclassical economics is to assume that families act like single agents.
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an econometrician might detect a violation of the weak axiom of revealed preference in
household consumption data. This would enable her to conclude that the household does
not act like a single rational decision-maker. (Of course the data might not be rich enough
so that the econometrician could detect violations of the weak axiom, even though the
actual household decisions are not consistent with the unitary model.)
It is a consequence of the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics that if
preferences are convex and there are no consumption externalities, then any household
that allocates marketable private goods efficiently among its members will act as if each
household member is given a personal income and is allowed to spend it as he or she wishes.
(See Chiappori (1988, 1992)). Combining this fact with our previous discussion, we see
that if preferences in a household are convex and if indirect utility is of the Gorman polar
form, then an efficiently operating household will act as if all household decisions were
made by a single utility-maximizing consumer.
The results of Bergstrom and Comes, (1981, 1983) allow us to extend this result to
the case where there are public goods as well as private goods. In particular, if indirect
utility is of the form V(p, mi, y) = a(p, y)m, + f#(p, y) and if the household chooses a
Pareto optimal allocation in which all household members consume some private goods ,
then the vector of public goods selected and the vector of total household consumption
of private goods is independent of the distribution of income within the household. As in
the case of private goods with Gorman polar form utility, an observer of the response of
household aggregates respond to prices and household income would not be able to reject
the hypothesis of decision-making by a single rational consumer.
Unitary Models with a Household Social Welfare Function
Samuelson (1956) and Varian (1984) point out that if income distribution within the
family is itself the result of an optimizing choice rather than arbitrarily determined as
in our previous discussion, then even for very general individual preferences, aggregate
household demand will behave as if it is the demand of a single maximizer. Suppose
that each household member i has a quasi-concave utility function of the form Ui(zi, y)
and that income distribution within the family is decided by a benevolent dictator who
has a utility function of the form W(Ui(x 1 , y),... , U,(zr,y)). The dictator could solve
for the allocation (xi,..., ,x, y*) which maximizes W(Ui(xi, y),... , U,(x,y)) subject
to p" EIEH x + p~y ; W and implement this outcome by providing the family with
the vector y* of public goods and giving family member an income of pzi, which i
would use to purchase z;. If we define the function V(x, y) to be the maximum of
W(U(xi, y),... , Un(z,y)) subject to E Z = x, then it will be the case that aggregate
demand in this family is always chosen so as to maximize V(z, y) subject to the family
budget constraint.
Samuelson suggests that even if a family is not a dictatorship, it might be that
"preferences of the different members are interrelated by what might be called
a 'consensus' or 'social welfare function' which takes into account the deserv-
ingness or ethical worths of the consumption levels of each of the members.
The family acts as if it were maximizing their joint welfare function."
The joint welfare function that Samuelson has in mind is a function of the form
W(Ui(zi, y),... , Un(z,y)) where W is an increasing function of each family members's
utility. A utility function of this kind is known as a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare
function.'
If a family chooses allocations to maximize a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare func-
tion subject to a family budget constraint, then the family's aggregate consumption is
rationalized by some utility function V(x, y) where V(x, y) is the maximum of
W(U1(ri, y),....,Un(zny))
subject to the constraint that F' zi = x. Therefore it is impossible using data on total
family consumption to distinguish the behavior of a family that maximizes a social welfare
function from the behavior of a single rational consumer. If W is a concave function of
A social welfare function of this type was introduced to economics by Abram Bergson (1938) and
further developed by Samuelson (1947).
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the zi's then it will also be true that the consumption of each family member is uniquely
determined by aggregate family income.
E. Eisenberg (1961) discovered that if each family member always gets a constant frac-
tion of income and if all family members have homothetic, but not necessarily identical,
preferences then family demand can be rationalized as the choice of a single individual.
This idea was clarified and generalized by John Chipman (1974), Wayne Shafer (1977),
and Perry Shapiro (1977). The difference between the Eisenberg theorem and the Gorman
theorem is that Gorman demands that arbitrary changes in the intra-family income distri-
bution have no effect on aggregate demand. Eisenberg demands only that a family where
income is always distributed according to predetermined fractions in order to behave like
a single consumer.
Unitary Models with The Rotten Kid Theorem
Gary Becker's "Rotten Kid Theorem", (1974, 1981) establishes another set of circum-
stances under which households act as if they were governed by a single, utility-maximizing
decision maker. In Becker's model, there is one consumption good and no public goods.
There is a single, benevolent parent and n selfish "kids", who care only about their own
consumptions. The parent's utility is given by U(zo,... , x,) where xo is the parent's con-
sumption and z; is the ith kid's consumption. Each kid i has an income, mi. The parent's
income mo is much larger than that of the kids and he chooses to make "gifts" to each
of them. Since the parent wants to make gifts to each kid, the post-gift distribution of
consumption in the family is the vector (xo,,..., x*), that maximizes the parent's utility,
U(xo,... , zn) subject to E! Ox = F,=o im. If each kid's consumption enters the parent's
utility function as a "normal good", then each kid's consumption is an increasing function
of total family income. If each person in the family chooses an action a; that influences
the income of other family members but does not influence their utility directly, then it
follows that all persons in the family seek to maximize total family income. The problem
of choosing the actions a, is therefore of the type that Marshak and Radner (1972) describe
as a problem in "team theory".
It should be recognized that Becker's results are not a trivial consequence of the house-
hold head being a "dictator." As Becker (1974) remarks, although the head is able to
choose consumption distributions, he is not able to dictate the actions a; that determine
individual incomes. Nevertheless, because of the head's distributional actions, all individ-
uals in the family will agree on the same objective function to pursue in their choices of
the ai's, namely maximization of total family income.
Assar Lindbeck and Jirgen Weibull (1988) and Neil Bruce and Michael Waldman (1990)
show that parental altruism can lead to inefficiency in a multi-period model. A similar
source of inefficiency in the context of government welfare programs was called the "Samar-
itan's Dilemma" by James Buchanan (1975).5 In the Bruce-Waldman model, if parents
make transfers to their children in the second period, then children will do too little saving.
But if parents confine their transfers to the first period, then children will have no incentive
to maximize joint family income in the second period. Lindbeck and Weibull extend the
analysis to cases where there is mutual benevolence between "parent" and "child". They
also point out that an important instance of this problem is the case of children support-
ing indigent parents. Parents will have too little incentive to save for their old age if the
support they will receive from their children is a decreasing function of the aged parents'
resources.
Bergstrom (1989) showed that the Rotten Kid theorem depends critically on an implicit
assumption of transferable utility.' The need for this assumption is illustrated by the
following example taken from Becker-the case of the controversial nightlight. A husband
likes to read at night, but the light interferes with his wife's slumber. The husband controls
the family budget, but he loves his wife and gives her a generous bundle of consumption
goods. He is aware that the nightlight annoys her and because he wants her to be happy,
he turns the light out earlier than he otherwise would. But he still uses the nightlight
more than she would like him to. One day, while the husband is away, an electrician drops
5 The biblical New Testament parable of the "Prodigal Son", Luke XV 11-32, seems more appropriate
to this problem than the parable of the "Good Samaritan".
9 David Johnson (1990) has independently obtained similar results.
18 19
by and offers to disconnect the nightlight in such a way that the husband would not be
able to use it again. The wife is convinced that the husband would never know the reason
that the nightlight was disconnected. But although she is entirely selfish and dislikes the
nightlight, she decides to refuse the electrician's offer. Becker reasons as follows. Although
the husband will not blame the wife for the loss of the nightlight, he will be made worse off.
This will change his utility-maximizing gift to his wife in such a way as to make her worse
off, despite her gain in utility from elimination of the nightlight. The effect, according
to Becker, is like a loss in family income. If the wife's utility is a "normal good" for the
husband, then the effect of a loss in family income is to choose a gift level that leaves her
with a lower utility than she had before the nightlight was eliminated.
Bergstrom shows by an example that Becker's conclusion is not in general correct.
For a reasonable choice of utility functions for husband and wife it turns out that even
after the husband adjusts his behavior in response to the loss of the nightlight, the wife is
better off than before it was disconnected. The reason this happens, is that removal of the
nightlight does not necessarily shift the household utility possibility frontier representing
private preferences toward the origin in a parallel fashion. Elimination of the nightlight
may also change the slope of this utility possibility frontier in such a way that there is a
"substitution effect" which induces the husband to give her a higher total utility than she
had when the nightlight was available.
11.2. The Family with Pluralistic Decision-Making
As is well-known, there is a rich and interesting competitive general equilibrium theory
for an economy with many consumers, even if aggregate consumption can not be rational-
ized as the choice of a single utility-maximizing consumer. Likewise, there are interesting
and useful economic theories of the household in the case where total household consump-
tion cannot be rationalized as the choice of a single consumer.
Proportional Sharing Rules
One of the simplest possible models of household consumption assumes that household
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income is always divided in prespecified proportions between household members and that
there are no public goods. Each household member chooses his or her own consumption
bundle to maximize utility subject to the resulting budget constraint. Samuelson (1956)
calls this division rule an example of a shibboleth and points out that in general, dividing
income in proportions that do not change when prices change would be inconsistent with
maximizing the utility of a benevolent parent or with maximizing a well-defined social
welfare function.
10
Cooperative Nash Bargaining Solutions
Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Homey (1981) applied the Nash cooperative
bargaining model to marriages. These authors modeled marriage as a static bilateral
monopoly in which a married couple can either remain married or divorce. There are
potential gains for both parties from remaining married rather than getting divorced.
These authors propose that the division of potential gains from marriage is determined
by the symmetric Nash bargaining model, where the threat point is that they dissolve the
marriage.
Specifically, they propose the following model. If they remain married, each partner has
a utility function U,(z;, y) where zi is i's vector of consumption of private goods (including
leisure) and y is the vector of household public goods that they share. There is a vector
of prices p,, for private goods and p, for public goods. The set of possible household
allocations consists of all vectors (zi, X2, y) such that pezi +pz2 +py = W1 + W2, where
W, is the "full income" of household member i.11 Given this information, it is possible to
construct the utility possibility set within this marriage. The utility that each person can
10 As Samuelson acknowledges, demands resulting from proportional income division would be rationalis-
able as the demand of a single consumer if preferences were identical and homothetic. As remarked above,
Eisenberg (1961) showed that this would be the case even if different household members had different
preferences so long as everyone's preferences are homothetic.
1 When we treat leisure as a commodity, full income is the value at market prices of a person's initial
endowment of nonhuman wealth plus the value of the total amount of labor the person could supply to
the market.
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achieve if the marriage is dissolved depends on prices and on his or her full income. Where
V is i's utility if the marriage is dissolved, the symmetric Nash bargaining solution is the
utility distribution (Ul*, U2) that maximizes (Ui - Vi)(U2 - V2) on the utility possibility
set.12
If the threat points Vi and V2 were independent of prices and individual incomes, then
in a household governed by Nash bargaining, aggregate demand could be rationalized by
the family utility function W(xi; x 2 , y) = (Ui(z i , y) - V1)(U 2 (z 2 , y) - V2). Aggregate
demand would obey the Slutsky conditions and the revealed preference axioms. But in the
model proposed by Manser and Brown and by McElroy and Hotney, the threat points VI
represent the utility levels that each person could achieve if he or she were not married.
These threat points generally will depend both on prices and on individual incomes. Since
the parameters V depend on prices and incomes, the family aggregate utility function U,
unlike the utility function of ordinary neoclassical consumers, depends on prices and on
the distribution of incomes as well as on consumption. McElroy and Horney work out the
"generalized Slutsky matrix" that corresponds to this situation and show that it will not
in general be symmetric; thus aggregate demand would not satisfy the revealed preference
axioms an
F. Woolley (1988) questions the assumption that divorce is the appropriate threat point
for Nash bargaining between spouses. Woolley examines a model in which the threat point
is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium within marriage and another model in which the
threat point is a "consistent conjectural equilibrium." Shelly Lundberg and Robert Pollak
(1993) propose a threat point that is not necessarily a non-cooperative equilibrium, but
a "division of labor based on socially recognized and sanctioned gender roles." Lundberg
and Pollak point out that their model (and Woolley's model) predict an empirical outcome
that differs strikingly from divorce-threat models and from Becker's Rotten Kid model: If
government childcare allowances are paid to mothers rather than to fathers in two-parent
12 This expression is sometimes known as the Nash product. John Nash (1950) proposed a set of axioms
for resolution of static two-person bargaining games such that the only outcomes that satisfy the axioms
maximize the Nash product on the utility possibility set.
households, the threat point envisioned by Lundberg and Pollak (or by Woolley) is likely
to shift in the mothers' favor. Accordingly, the outcomes of cooperative bargaining within
households are likely to be more favorable to women. By contrast, in divorce-threat models,
the outcome of bargaining depends only on the total resources available to the household
and on the utilities that each would receive if they divorced. Whether the nominal recipient
of childcare allowances in a marriage is the husband or wife would have no effect on total
resources available to the married couple nor would it change the resources available to
either spouse if they were to divorce. Therefore the divorce-threat model predicts that
such differences would have no effect on allocation within married households. Similarly
in Becker's Rotten-Kid model, the well-being of each household member is determined by
total family income, independently of intrafamily income distribution.
Empirical tests of the unitary model based on private-goods consumption
McElroy (1990) observed that it is possible in principle to test the unitary model of family
decision-making, even if one can not observe consumption of individual household mem-
bers, using observations of aggregate household consumption and of other variables that
could affect an individual's threat point; for example the wage rates and unearned incomes
of each household member. If, holding prices and incomes constant, the distribution of
income within the household has significant effects on demand, then one would reject the
unitary hypothesis.
Stronger tests will be possible if it is possible to determine which household member
is the ultimate consumer. For most commodities, this is very difficult to obtain, but there
are some interesting exceptions. Sometimes data is available about the amount of leisure
consumed by each household member. For a useful discussion and an extensive description
of the data available from time-allocation studies in Canada, Europe, Japan, see F. Thomas
Juster and Frank Stafford (1991). Ingenious use has also been made of studies in which
the nature of the goods strongly suggest the gender of the ultimate consumer.
T. Paul Schultz (1990) found that in Thailand, an increase in a woman's unearned
income from outside the household will have a larger negative effect on the probability that
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she joins the labor force than does an equal increase in her husband's unearned outside
income. According to Martin Browning, Fransois Bourguignon, Pierre-Andre Chiappori,
and Valerie Lechene (1992), in Canada the shares of the family budget devoted to mens'
clothing and to womens' clothing are positively related to the shares of family income
earned respectively by men and women. Using data from a household survey from the
Cote d'Ivoire, John Hoddinott and Lawrence Haddad (1991) report that "increases in the
proportion of cash income accruing to women significantly raise the budget share of food
and lower those of alcohol and cigarettes. "
The results found by Schultz, Browning et al, and Hoddinott and Haddad would not
be observed in a unitary model of household demand. Schultz is able to peek inside the
family black box and observe separate consumptions of leisure by husbands and by wives.
Hoddinott and Haddad do not directly observe which household members consume the
food or the alcohol and cigarettes, nor do Browning and his coworkers know who wears the
trousers in Canadian families. The finding that an increase in the wife's share of family
income tends to increase consumption of food and women's clothes and an increase in the
husband's share tends to increase consumption of cigarettes, alcohol, and men's clothes is,
however, indirect evidence that men in Cote d'Ivoire consume more cigarettes and alcohol
than women, and that people in Canada tend to wear gender-appropriate clothing.
The well-being of children, household public goods, and Pareto efficiency
Duncan Thomas (1990) found evidence that in Brazilian families, unearned income of
the mother has a much stronger positive effect on fertility and on measures of child health
such as caloric intake, weight, height, and survival probability than unearned income of the
father. For fertility and measures of caloric intake, the effect of mothers' income is about
8 times as large as that of fathers' income. For survival probability, the effect of mothers'
income is nearly 20 times as large. Hoddinott and Haddad find that in Cote d'Ivoire,
childrens' height for age is positively related to the share of family wealth controlled by
their mothers. Schultz finds that in Thailand, an increase in a woman's unearned income
tends to increase her fertility while an increase in her husband's unearned income does
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not.
The results of Thomas, Hoddinott and Haddad, and Schultz on child welfare and fer-
tility, suggest that the distribution of control of resources within the family influences the
composition of household demand. But unlike the commodities leisure, clothing, and al-
cohol and tobacco discussed above, child health and fertility are household public goods
jointly "consumed" by both the husband and wife. In the case of private goods, the theory
suggested as an alternative to the unitary theory is that the distribution of earnings within
the household determines the way in which household expenditure budgets are divided be-
tween household members. As Woolley (1988) observed, where the commodity in question
is a household public good, even if the wife values the commodity more than her huband, it
does not follow that more of the public good will be supplied at Pareto optimal allocations
that accord more utility to the wife.
Suppose, for example, that the household always chooses a Pareto efficient allocation
and that utilities are of the U,(x,y) = A(y)x; + B;(y) where y is child welfare andx, is
i's private consumption. According to Bergstrom and Cornes (1981,1983), when utility
functions are of this form the Pareto efficient choice of child welfare will be independent
of the distribution of income within the household. This will be the case, even if B',(y) >
B,(y) for all y-an assumption that implies that the wife is more concerned about child
welfare than the husband-and even if A'(y) > 0, an assumption that implies that child
care is a normal good for both husband and wife. " This is not to say that the results of
Thomas, Schultz, and Haddad-Hoddinott are inconsistent with Pareto efficient allocations
within the household. Alternative utility functions can be found such that Pareto efficient
allocations that give higher utility to the wife are allocations with greater amounts of child
welfare. But it is important to realize that if this is the explanation, it rides on stronger
assumptions on household preferences than the assumptions that child welfare is a normal
13 The reason for this rather puzzling result is that a transfer of private consumption from husband to
wife would typically increase her marginal willingness to pay for the public good, child care, and would
decrease his. To assume that her marginal rate of substitution between child care and private consumption
is higher than his is not sufficient to imply that a transfer of income from him to her will increase her
marginal rate of substitution by more than it will reduce his.
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good and the wife is more concerned about child welfare than the husband.
An alternative to assuming that allocation is efficient within households is the hypoth-
esis that public goods like child care are provided by voluntary contributions in a non-
cooperative equilibrium. Woolley (1988) proposed this model of family decision-making
as the threat point for Nash bargaining and investigated its comparative statics under
the assumption of Stone-Geary utility. Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) explore the
general comparative statics of Nash equilibrium in voluntary public goods supply. Weiss
and Willis (1985) suggest that divorced couples, because they are not able to monitor each
other's activities, are likely to reach an inefficient, noncooperative equilibrium in supplying
resources to their children. In contrast, married couples (who plan to stay married) are
likely to be able to sustain an efficient outcome because of the repeated nature of their
interaction and because they are able to observe each others' actions closely.
If a household public good is supplied as a noncooperative Nash equilibrium between
husband and wife there are three possible equilibrium regimes (i) the wife supplies a positive
amount and the husband supplies none, (ii) the husband and wife each supply a positive
amount (iii) the husband supplies a positive amount and the wife supplies none. According
to Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian, if equilibrium is in regime (i) an increase in wife's wealth
relative to husband's would increase expenditures on the public good. If equilibrium is in
regime (iii) an increase in wife's wealth relative to husband's would decrease expenditures
on the public good, and if the equilibrium is in regime (ii), income redistribution within
the family would have no effect on the equilibrium supply of the public good.
A possible explanation of the findings redistribution of income toward wives has a
strong positive effect on child welfare is that the families observed by Thomas, Shultz,
and Haddad and Hoddinott are in non-cooperative Nash equilibria where the wife is the
only contributor to the public good, child welfare. It would be interesting to find direct
evidence that bears on whether the explanation lies here or whether outcomes in the
families reflect a difference in the amount of child care appropriate to different points on
the utility possibility frontier.
Testing the hypothesis of Pareto Efficiency with private goods
The evidence of Schultz, Browning et al, and Haddad and Hoddinott on private goods is
tends to support rejection of the unitary hypothesis on household demand, but these results
provide no direct evidence about whether households allocations are Pareto efficient. Chi-
appori (1988, 1992) points out that a cooperative Nash solution with divorce as the threat
point is not the only alternative to the unitary hypothesis of family decision-making, even
if the assumption of Pareto efficiency within households is maintained. Chiappori proposes
to test the weaker hypothesis that a family chooses some efficient point on the household
utility possibility frontier, using only data on household aggregate consumption. He stud-
ies a model in which each member of a married couple consumes a "Hicksian composite"
private good and leisure. The two household members are assumed to be "price-takers"
both in the goods market and the labor market and are free to work as many hours as they
choose. Household aggregate demand is therefore formally the same as aggregate demand
in a competitive economy with two consumers and three commodities. According to Diew-
ert (1977), competitive equilibrium in an economy with more commodities than consumers
must obey certain empirically falsifiable restrictions. In his 1988 paper, Chiappori spells
out Diewert's restrictions as applied to his two-consumer, three-commodity model, both
in parametric form and in a non-parametric, revealed-preference form.
Noncooperative Bargaining 'Theory
The Nash cooperative solution predicts that the outcome of a static, two-person bargaining
game will be the outcome that maximizes the product of the two persons' utility gains
over the threat point that would obtain in the absence of disagreement. But deciding
the appropriate threat point is problematic. Should the threat point be divorce as in
Manser, Brown, McElroy and Homey? Should it be an uncooperative marriage in which
spouses revert to socially sanctioned gender roles for uncooperative spouses as in Lundberg
and Pollak? If either party to a marriage has the right to divorce the other, should the
threat point for each person be the maximum of his or her utility from divorce and from
a noncooperative marriage?
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The Nash axioms are of no direct help in deciding the appropriate threat point in
specific models. But recent work on the noncooperative foundations of bargaining theory
offers useful guidance on this question. Ariel Rubinstein (1982) developed an extensive
form multi-period bargaining game for two agents in which a cake is to be partitioned only
after the players reach agreement. Players alternate in proposing how to divide the cake,
with one time period elapsing between each offer. Both agents are impatient; player i
discounts future income by the discount factor S;. Thus, the utility to player i of receiving
w units of cake in period t is woS. Rubinstein proved that in the limit as the time between
proposals becomes small, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is for the cake to be divided
in the first period with player i's share of the cake being a, = &;/(8i1+a2). More generally, if
agent i's utility from receiving w; units of cake in period t is ui(w)8 where ui is a concave
function, then the only perfect equilibrium is the allocation that maximizes the "generalized
Nash product", uiuz" on the utility possibility set {(u,(w),u2(1 - w)|0 < w < 1)}. In
case the two agents have equal discount rates, this outcome is the same as the symmetric
Nash equilibrium where the threat point is (0,0).
Binmore (1985) shows how the Rubinstein model can be extended to the case where
each of the bargaining agents has access to an "outside option". Binmore's model is like the
Rubinstein model, except that each agent i has the option of breaking off negotiations at
any time and receiving a payoff of m; units of cake, in which case the other player receives
no cake. Given that the outcome in the game without outside options is the same as the
Nash cooperative equilibrium with threat point (0,0), one might conjecture that the effect
of the outside options would be to move the threat point to (mI, m2). (If negative values
of m; are considered, this conjecture might be amended to (max{0, ml}, max{0, mz}).
Binmore demonstrates, that this is not the answer. Instead, it turns out that the only
perfect equilibrium for the game with outside options is an agreement in the first period
on the utility distribution (u,,9U2) that maximizes the Nash product ui1uz' on the utility
possibility set {ua(w),u2(1 - w)10 w < 1} subject to the constraint that u, 2 m; for
each i. In general, this solution is not the same as maximizing (ui - ml)*1'(u2 - m2)°2
on the utility possibility set, which would be the outcome of shifting the threat point to
(m,,m2). A similar argument is made by Sutton (1987) and the argument is presented in
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more detail in a paper by Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton (1989). In this paper the authors
report on laboratory tests in which subjects were engaged in a Rubinstein bargaining game
with outside options. Behavior in this game was much better predicted by the Binmore
model than by the competing model in which the outside option is the threat point.
Binmore's model of bargaining with an outside option has an interesting interpretation
for bargaining models of marriage. Consider a married couple who expect to live forever
in a stationary environment. Suppose that in any period, there is transferable utility with
the utility possibility frontier {(ui, ua)|ui + u2 = 1}. Each spouse has an intertemporal
utility function that is a discounted sum of the period-by-period utility flows. Spouse i
evaluates the time path (ui, ... , ut,...) of period utilities by the utility function E i ugt;,
where 6, < 1 is i's discount factor. Let b, be the utility that spouse i would get in any
period where the couple stays married, but does not reach agreement and suppose that if
they divorce, then spouse i will get a utility of v; in every subsequent period. Assume that
bi + b2 = b < 1 and m, + m2 = m < 1. This means that there are potential gains for both
persons in reaching an agreement about how to divide utility.
As in Rubinstein, the spouses alternate in making offers of feasible utility distributions.
Following Binmore's argument, one finds that in the limit as the time between offers
approaches zero, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is one in which the spouses agree
immediately to distribute utility in every period in such a way as to maximize the Nash
product (ui - bi)(u2 - b2) subject to ui + u2 = 1 and subject to u1 > m, for i = 1,2.
Depending on the parameters m; and b;, there are three possible types of solution:
(i) Neither of the outside option constraints u v, is binding. In this case, the
outcome is ul = bi + (1 - b)/2 and u2 = b2 + (1 - b)/2. Neither outside option is binding
if b, +(1 - b)/2 > m, for i = 1 and i = 2.
(ii) The outside option is binding for person 1, but not for person 2. In this case the
solution is ui - vi and u2 = 1 -v 1 . This happens if b + (1 -b)/2 < mi.
(iii) The outside option is binding for person 2, but not for person 1. In this case the
solution is U2 = v2 and ul = 1 - v2 . This happens if b2 + (1- b)/2 < M2,
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The first of these cases corresponds to the Lundberg-Pollak cooperative solution where
the threat point is not divorce, but a noncooperative marriage. In the other two cases, the
divorce threat is relevant, but notice that the outcome is never the outcome predicated
by the Manser-Brown and McElroy-Horney models. When the divorce threat is relevant,
there is not an equal split of the gains from being married rather than divorced. Instead
one partner enjoys all of the surplus and the other is indifferent between being divorced
and being married.
In the absence of agreement one might expect harsh words and burnt toast until the
next offer is made. If the couple were to persist in noncooperative behavior forever, the
outcome might be worse for one or both persons than being divorced. But divorce (as
we have modelled it) is irrevocable, while a bargaining impasse need last only as long as
the time between a rejected offer and acceptance of a counteroffer. So long as the gains
from marriage are divided in such a way that both are better off being married than being
divorced, a threat of divorce is not credible. But for many divisions of utility, a threat of
delayed agreement and a later counterproposal is credible. In fact the Rubinstein theorem
tells us that there is only one equilibrium division of utility in which no such threat is
credible.
Rubinstein's original bargaining model can be relaxed in the direction of realism with-
out altering the main results. Binmore (1985) shows that one can relax the assumption
that the two parties take turns making offers and that the period between offers is of fixed
length. Qualitatively similar results obtain when the length of time between offers and the
person whose turn it is to make the next offer are randomly determined after every re-
fusal. It is straightforward to add a constant probability of death for each partner without
seriously changing the model. On the other hand, stationarity of the model seems to be
necessary for Rubinstein's beautifully simple result. This stationarity is lacking in a model
where children grow up and leave the family and where the probability of death increases
with age. It would be useful to know more about the robustness of the Rubinstein results
to more realistic models of the family. For the time being, Rubinstein's model and its
extensions seem to be "the only game in town" as far as giving us a theoretical basis for
distinguishing among plausible alternative bargaining theories of the household.
III. Theories of the Marriage and Household Membership
III.1. Matching Models
The Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Assignment
In a beautiful short paper, David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962) introduced the concept of
a stable marriage assignment and presented a "courtship algorithm" that leads to a stable
assignment of marriage partners for arbitrary configurations of preference rankings of the
opposite sex as possible marriage partners. This model has been extended and developed
by several authors. See Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for an excellent survey of this work.
Here we follow Roth and Sotomayor in presenting a slightly modified version of Gale and
Shapley's model that allows the option of remaining single to persons who don't want
anyone who will have them.
Consider a population consisting of n men and p women. Each person i in the popula-
tion is able to rank all members of the opposite sex as possible marriage partners and also
to determine which members of the opposite sex he or she would be willing to marry if
remaining single were the only alternative. All persons satisfying the latter condition are
said to be acceptable to i. A monogamous assignment of marriage partners is said to be
stable if no two people of opposite sexes would prefer each other to their assigned partners,
if no married person would prefer being single to being married to his or her spouse and
if no two single people would prefer being married to each other over being single.
The "men-propose" version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm has each man propose to
his favorite woman. Each woman rejects the proposal of any man who is unacceptable to
her, and if she receives more than one proposal she rejects the proposal of any but the
most preferred of these. To her most preferred suitor she says "maybe". At each step in
the procedure, men who have been rejected move to their next choice so long as there are
any acceptable women to whom they have not proposed. Women reject proposals from
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unacceptable men and from any but the best of their current suitors, including any man
to whom she said "maybe" on the previous step. The algorithm continues until a step is
reached where no man is rejected. At this point, all women marry the last man to whom
they said "maybe."
In general, the assignment resulting from the men-propose version of the Gale-Shapley
algorithm is different from that produced by the women-propose version. The difference
between these outcomes reveals a remarkable polarity of interest between men and women.
When all men and women have strict preference orderings over the opposite sex, the
men-propose assignment turns out to be at least as good for every man as any other
stable marriage assignment and to be at least as bad for every woman as any other stable
assignment. Conversely, the "women propose" assignment is at least as good for every
woman and at least as bad for every man as any other stable assignment. In general
there can be other stable assignments besides the men-propose and the women-propose
assignments. The set of stable assignments has the following lattice property, which Roth
and Sotomayor attribute to (Donald Knuth (1976)). For any two stable assignments, the
assignment in which each woman is given the man she likes better from the two assignments
is also a stable assignment. Since both original assignments were stable, it can be shown
that the assignment in which each woman gets her preferred man from the two original
assignments is the same as the assignment where each man gets his least preferred partner
from these two assignments. This polarity of interest is further developed by Roth and
Sotomayor (pp 44-46) who show that either adding more women to the marriage market or
enlarging some women's lists of acceptable men will (if it has any effect at all) help some
men and harm no men and harm some women and help no women.
Marriage Markets as a Linear Programming Assignment
Lloyd Shapley and Martin Shubik (1972) and Becker (1974) suggest that the market for
marital partners can be posed formally as the classic linear programming assignment prob-
lem. 4 The assignment problem is one of the early showcase applications of linear pro-
14 A thorough discussion of the assignment model and its extensions is found in Roth and Sotomayor.
gramming techniques (Danzig (1951)). Not only does linear programming offer powerful
algorithms for finding an optimal assignment. It also yields dual variables which can serve
as "shadow prices" to guide decentralized implementation of the optimum as a market
solution.
Tjalling Koopmans and Martin Beckmann (1957) developed the assignment problem
as an economic tool. Their model has n workers and n jobs. Each worker can be assigned
to one and only one job. The value of output from worker i in job j would be a specified
amount, a j. An efficient assignment maximizes the total value of output from all workers
subject to the constraint that each worker can only have one job and each job must be
done by only one worker. The dual solution to this linear program yields a vector of wages
for workers and of rents for jobs such that for any worker i and job j, w, + r& aij where
w; wage of worker i and r3 is the rental price of job j. If the optimal solution assigns i to
j, then w, + r3 = a,3 . The optimal solution has the property that if the "owner" of job j
acts as "residual claimant " in the sense that he must pay the equilibrium wage wk to any
worker k that he "hires" and receives the net payoff aik - wk, his return is maximized if
he hires i where i is the worker assigned to job j by the maximization problem. Likewise,
if worker i were the residual claimant after paying the equilibrium rent rg to the "owner"
of any job that he took, he would maximize his return by taking the job j that is assigned
to him by the linear programming solution.
The Koopmans-Beckmann model can be interpreted as a problem in optimal marriage
assignments, where one sex plays the formal role of workers and the other the role of firms.
For each male, i, and each female, j, there is a number asj which measures the amount
of "marital bliss" that would be produced if i married j. Each male is only allowed to
marry one female and each female is only allowed to marry one male. The solution to the
assignment problem determines not only who is assigned to whom, but also how the jointly
produced marital bliss is "divided" between the partners of the marriages that form. This
division is determined by the "prices" in the dual linear program, just as wages and rents
are found in the Koopmans-Beckman interpretation.
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Shapley and Shubik develop the game-theoretic interpretation of the assignment model
of marriage. They observe that the "core" or equivalently the "set of stable marriage as-
signments" in a marriage assignment game with transferable utility consists of the (gener-
ically unique) assignment of partners that solves the linear programming problem and
any division of utility among the marriage partners such that the equilbrium utilities of
each individual are dual variables for the optimization problem. Shapley and Shubik show
that the set of stable marriage assignments has the same polarity between the interests
of the sexes as the Gale-Shapley model. There is a "male-best" stable assignment and
a "female-best" stable assignment. In the male-best (female-best) assignment, each male
(female) is at least as well off as he (she) is in any other stable assignment. The set of
stable assignments also shares the lattice property that was discussed for the Gale-Shapley
algorithm.
Marriage Assignments with and without Transferable Utility
The special ingredient that makes it possible to pose marriage as an assignment problem
is transferable utility. The interpretation of marriage as an assignment problem has it that
for each male, i, and female, j, there is a number a,3 such that if i marries j they will
produce a,, units of "bliss" which can be divided between them in any way such that the
sum of i's bliss and j's bliss is a,3. On the face of it, the assumption that the total utility
from a marriage could be redistributed between the partners just like money or jelly beans
seems crude and unreasonable. But, as we showed in the model of transferable utility
and mate selection in Section 1.4, a transferable utility framework can accomodate a wide
range of interesting and subtle interactions between marital partners.
The Gale-Shapley model is at the opposite extreme from transferable utility. The
model contains no allowance for altering the terms of marriage. Since there are no "side-
payments", the utility possibility frontier available to any two potential spouses is just
a single point. If it is possible for potential marriage partners to draw up premarital
contracts which determine in advance the household's choice of public goods and division
of private goods, then the Gale-Shapley model is very unrealistic. But if credible and
binding premarital contracts are not possible then, as we will see, there are reasonable
models in which the relevant part of the utility possibility frontier for any pair is a single
point.
Vincent Crawford and Elsie Knoer (1981) present an ingenious extension of the Gale-
Shapley algorithm that works when monetary side-payments can be made but which does
not require transferable utility.' 5 In their model side-payments are measured in discrete
units. Individuals rank options that are specified not only by whom one mates but also
by the size of promised side-payments. In the initial round, the side-payment of each
member of the proposing sex is restricted to a low level. Proposals, refusals and maybes
proceed as in the Gale-Shapley algorithm, but each time a member of the proposing sex
is refused, the side-payment that he is allowed to offer to the refusing individual increases
by one unit. This process continues until no proposal is rejected. The outcome is a stable
assignment of partners. Gabriella Demange and David Gale show that general models
with side-payments but without transferable utility share the lattice property found for
the Gale-Shapley model and for the asssignment model. These results are well summarized
by Roth and Sotomayor.
Manoru Kaneko (1982) also analyzes general models of "two-sided exchange economies"
that include both the Gale-Shapley model and the transferable utility model as well as
markets where there are side-payments without transferable utility. Kaneko shows that
for his model the core is non-empty and coincides with the set of competitive equilibria.
Strategic Issues in Stable Matching
Roth and Sotomayor present several interesting results about the extent to which assign-
ment mechanisms can be manipulated. If marriages were assigned by the Gale-Shapley
algorithm with males proposing to females, then unless there is only one stable matching
for the population, there will be at least one woman who will be better off if she misrep-
resents her preferences. More generally, there exists no stable matching algorithm which
1s The Crawford-Knoer results are generalized by Alexander Kelso and Crawford (1982).
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would make truth-telling a dominant strategy for all members of the population. In the
Cale-Shapley algorithm, with males proposing, it is dominant strategy for the males to
reveal their preferences truthfully. In general, a woman would need a great deal of informa-
tion about others' preferences in order to know how to improve her outcome by deceptive
play. But suppose that each woman knew who her match would be in the women-propose
version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm and suppose that in the play of the men-propose
algorithm, each woman declares a man to be unacceptable if she likes him less well than
the mate that she would be assigned in the women-propose outcome. This configuration
of strategies would be a strong Nash equilibrium.'
6
111.2. Household Allocation in the Shadow of the Marriage Market
Gifts, commitment, and divorce
H. Lorne Carmichael and W. Bentley MacLeod (1993) propose a theory of gifts as a
commitment device in long term relationships. Their theory offers a partial answer to
such questions as : Why are courting males expected to offer "inefficient" gifts such as cut
flowers, or gift-wrapped, perishible chocolates? What explains seemingly wasteful expen-
ditures on such commodities as engagement rings, wedding rings, and expensive weddings?
Carmichael and MacLeod consider an overlapping generations model in which individuals.
individuals find a partner with whom they will play repeated prisoners' dilemma. After
each round in the game, each player has the option of abandoning his or her current part-
neror offering to play another round. If either partner chooses to abandon, then both
must return to the matching market to acquire a new mate. All players who return to the
marriage market are assumed to find a match for the next period. At the beginning of
a new match, there is no information available regarding an individual's play in previous
matches.
16 A strong Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium that has the additional property that no subgroup of
the players would all benefit by changing their actions if the actions of players outside this subgroup are
left unchanged.
In games of repeated prisoners' dilemma, where abandonment is not a possible action,
it is well-known that for a large range of parameter values, cooperative behavior can be
sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium by "punishment strategies" that offer cooper-
ation so long as one's partner cooperates and defection for at least some period of time if
the partner should defect. (See, for example, Robert Axelrod (1984).) But, as Carmichael
and MacLeod demonstrate, if abandonment is possible there can not be an equilibrium
in which new relationships begin costlessly and all agents cooperate in every period. The
reason is simple. If all other agents cooperate at each stage, a player could defects on his
partner in the first round, abandon her, and play the same trick on a new partner in the
next round.
17 
Such a defector would receive the benefits of defecting against a cooperat-
ing partner in every round of the game. Carmichael and MacLeod suggest that in such
an environment, lasting cooperation could be sustained by a convention in which at the
beginning of a new relationship, each partner is expected to give a gift at the beginning of
the relationship. In the equilibrium proposed by Carmichael and MacLeod, nobody will
be willing to start a new relationship with someone who does not offer the conventional
gift. If the cost of the gift is large enough, cooperative behavior can be sustained in Nash
equilibrium if everyone chooses the strategy of making the conventional gift and playing
cooperate so long as his or her partner plays cooperate and by abandoning the partner if
the partner ever plays defect. In such an environment, it does not pay to defect against
your partner because if you do, the partner will leave you and you will have to reenter the
matching market and present a new gift in order to attract a mate. If the required gift
is large enough relative to the gains from defecting on your partner, defection will not be
worthwhile. The authors point out that for the gifts to serve this purpose, they should
expensive, but of little benefit to the recipient and certainly not resellable. Otherwise, the
cost of buying a gift for your new partner would be nullified by the benefit of receiving a
gift when you reenter the marriage market.
17 The model presented by Carmichael and MacLeod is a one-sex model. The main idea extend readily
to the two-sex case, but it would be interesting to consider the effects of asymmetries between the sexes ,
especially asymmetries in the cost of being abandoned.
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Household Equilibrium without Perfect Information
David Roth (1992) develops a model of a potentially long-lived partnership in which the
partners do not know with certainty how "good" the partnership will be relative to their
outside opportunities. If the partnership were known with certainty to be a "good one",
the partners would understand that it will be long-lived and will both invest substantial
resources in it. As time passes, the partners learn about the quality of their partnership by
observing current and past outcomes. The greater the amount of investment in the part-
nership, the more likely that good realizations will occur in each period. The more good
realizations that are observed, the more likely the partners are to invest. In the model as
formulated by Roth, no matter how much is invested, "bad" partnerships will eventually
be discovered to be bad, but some "good" partnerships are dissolved by rational decision-
makers because a run of bad luck has led the partners to think that the partnership will
not last and hence the partners do not invest. Roth develops an iterative procedure sug-
gested by dynamic programming which enable him to compute and characterize sequential
equilibria for this game.
Divorce as a threat point in bargaining
In the bargaining models discussed in section II.2, the payoff from being divorced is deter-
mined outside the model. For many people who consider divorce, the utility of the divorce
option depends on the utility of forming a second marriage.'s But the utility of a second
marriage must be determined as part of the same theory that determines the distribution of
utility within all marriages. Sharon Rochford (1985) defines an equilibrium which she calls
a symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocation (SPB) that captures this idea. Rochford's
model has transferable utility within households. She defines an SPB to be an assignment
of partners and an allocation of payoffs within marriages such that the division of utility
within each marriage is determined by bargaining, where the threat point is determined by
18 Weiss and Willis (1993) report that in a sample taken in 1985 of Americans who had graduated from
high school in 1972, about 60% of those persons who divorced during the period since high school had
remarried.
the utility each spouse would get from divorce and remarriage. A person's threat point in
a marriage is the highest utility that he or she could achieve as a Nash cooperative solution
in some other marriage where the threat points in the other marriage are the utilities the
two hypothetical partners get in their current marriages. Rochford proposes an iterative
process that is guaranteed to converge to an SPB. Benny Moldevanu (1992) considers a
model of trading partners and formulates an equilibrium concept similar to Rochford's.
He is able to extend her results to economies without transferable utility.
The models proposed by Rochford and by Moldevanu do not include explicit costs
of divorce. While the costs of switching from one partner to another may be small for
trading partners, this is not likely to be the case for marriage partners, who are likely to
have invested significant amounts of "marriage-specific capital" that will be lost if they
divorce. If the partners have children, then arrangements for sharing the costs and joys of
child care become difficult and inefficient.19 In societies where divorce is unusual, divorced
people are sometimes ostracized or at least suspected of being unusually difficult to live
with.
The introduction of costs of divorce will markedly affect the workings of the formal
model. As Moldevanu points out, in a model like Rochford's, if each person has at least
one "clone", then any core allocation, including the symmetrically pairwise-bargained al-
locations would have the property that identical people must be equally well off. In this
case, the SPB allows no scope for bargaining within households. In equilibrium, each
married couple would correspond to another couple just like them with the same payoffs.
The threat point of each individual would be the same as the utility he or she obtains in
equilibrium. In the absence of clones, if there were very close substitutes for each person
in the society, spouses would not have much surplus to bargain over, once each is given at
least his or her outside option.
19 See Weise and Willis (1985) for a discussion of incentive problems that arise for child care in divorce
settlements.
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Household bargaining with outside options
Avner Shaked and John Sutton (1984) discuss a model of labor and management which
is formally similar to a model of a marriage in which divorce is costly. In their model the
firm has a current workforce which it cannot replace immediately or costlessly. They impose
these costs by putting a restriction on the timing of offers in a Rubenstein bargaining model.
This leads to an outcome that is intermediate between a bilateral monopoly outcome where
neither side has an outside option and the "Walrasian" outcome, which would obtain if
there were no costs to a firm from changing its workforce.
Ariel Rubinstein and Asher Wolinsky (1985) have a model of transactions between
pairs of agents who meet randomly and bargain if they meet. Their model, viewed as a
model of marriage, offers an interesting interpretation of the "costs of divorce". There are
two types of agents, buyers and sellers. All agents of a given type are identical. At the
beginning of each time period, there is a matching stage, where each agent tries to find
a new partner. Some agents will find partners, some will not. Any buyer and seller who
meet will start to bargain according to a noncooperative iterative bargaining scheme. If
these two agents reach agreement, a transaction occurs and they leave the market. If they
do not reach agreement in this period, there is a chance that one or both of them will
meet another agent of the opposite type. If this happens, the agent ceases bargaining with
his or her current bargaining partner and starts bargaining with the newly-met partner.
If neither meets a new partner, the current partners proceed together to the next round
of bargaining. The cost of not reaching agreement in the current period is now twofold.
If agreement is ultimately reached with the current partner, there is a cost of delay. In
addition there is the risk that one's current bargaining partner will meet someone else
before the next round of offers. If one is abandoned by one's current partner, one will not
be sure to meet anybody to bargain with in the next period. When the number of buyers
does not equal the number of sellers, it takes longer on average for the abundant type to
find a new partner than it does for the scarce type. Because of this, the abundant type
will be willing to concede a larger share of the gains from agreement than will the scarce
type.
Binmore's version of the Rubinstein model with outside options, discussed in the pre-
vious section, has strong and interesting implications if all people who divorce eventually
remarry, but face a transactions cost in the process. Consider the special case of a large pop-
ulation of identical males and of identical females. A male and female who marry and who
reach agreement can achieve any constant flow of utility (um, uj) such that urn + uf = 1.
Utilities are normalized so that the utility flow while the partners are in disagreement is 0
for each. At any stage in the bargaining process, either spouse can either accept the other
person's offer, reject the other person's offer and make a counteroffer, or ask for a divorce.
If the two spouses have equal time rates of discount, then in equilibrium, according to
Binmore's results, the outcome will be an allocation of utility (urn, uj) that maximizes
the Nash product umuf subject to the constraints that urn + u f = 1, and that each per-
son gets a utility at least as high as his or her outside option. The utility distribution
(Ur, tuj) = (1/2,1/2) maximizes umuf subject to u,,,+u f = 1. Given that the equilibrium
distribution of utility in a marriage is (urn, u) a person who divorces and remarries will
have to bear a divorce cost of cm if he is male and cf if she is female. Therefore the utility
of a male who takes the outside option of divorce and remarriage is fl. - c,,, < in and the
utility of a female who chooses this option is d f - cj <iuf. Therefore so long as divorce
costs are positive for both parties, the presence of the outside option does not influence
the bargaining outcome.
In this model, unlike the Rubinstein-Wolinsky model, the distribution of utility within
marriages does not depend on the relative supplies of males and females, but only on
their impatience and on the position of the utility possibility frontier relative to the non-
cooperative outcome within marriage. The difference seems to lie in the fact that in the
Rubinstein-Wolinsky model, an individual who "meets a stranger" of the opposite sex can
abandon his or her spouse without bearing any transaction cost (though the abandoned
spouse may be in for a long wait before another offer appears.) In the variant of the Bin-
more model just proposed, a threat by either party to abandon the current marriage is not
credible because persons who divorce would have to pay the transactions cost of divorce
and remarriage and when they are done with this, would be in no better bargaining situa-
tion than they were before divorcing. These ideas can readily be extended to a community
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with many types of males and females and very general utility possibility frontiers within
each possible marriage.
When there are divorce costs to both parties, the Binmore argument implies the strik-
ing conclusion that even though technology and preferences allow transferable utility, the
nature of bargaining determines that there is only one possible distribution of utility be-
tween any two people if they should marry. This outcome is the Nash cooperative solution
with uncooperative marriage as the threat point. Despite the presence of side-payments
and the availability of remarriage as an outside option, the original Gale-Shapley model
without side-payments then applies. This means that the marriage market suffers from
rigidity of a "price" which may be important for clearing the marriage market. If it were
possible to settle the distribution of utility within possible marriages in advance by a bind-
ing contract, then the distribution of utility between males and females within marriages
would respond to competitive forces in such a way as to tend to equilibrate the number
of males and the number of females who choose to marry at any time. If, on the other
hand, the distribution of utility within marriages is determined by a threat point such as
uncoooperative marriage, which is independent of market forces, then changes in the terms
of marriage can not be expected to equalize imbalances in supplies of the two sexes in the
marriage market.
111.2. Age at Marriage
Classical One-Sex Population Theory
Classical Stable Population Theory as developed by Albert Lotka (1922), shows that if
current age-specific fertility and mortality rates for females remain unchanged, then in
the long run, the age distribution of the population would asymptotically approach some
constant distribution, and therefore raw birth rates and population growth rates would
approach constancy. This fact has encouraged demographers to project hypothetical long
run population growth rates implied by current age-specific female fertility. Since every
baby has a father as well as a mother, it is possible (in societies that have good data
on paternity) to construct tables of age-specific rates at which the current population of
males father children. This data can be used to make an alternative projection of long run
population growth rates parallel to the projections made using a female one-sex model.
Perhaps surprisingly, when the male one-sex model is applied to actual populations, the
predictions are often quite different from those found by applying it to females. For
example, using 1968 data in a one-sex model for U.S. males would predict a long term
population growth rate of 10.1 per 1,000 populations, while the female one-sex model
would predict a long term population growth rates of 5.7 per 1,000 population. (Prithwis
Das Gupta (1973).) Since every child that is born, must have exactly one mother and
one father, it is simply numerically impossible that both sexes would maintain the same
age-specific fertility and mortality rates after 1968 as did the population surveyed in 1968.
Since every wedding also involves one male and one female, the same logical difficulty is
present in efforts to predict future marriage rates of males and of females separately, by
projecting current age and sex specific marriage rates into the future.
Two-Sez Theories of Mating
Modern demographers (Nathan Keyfitz (1971), Das Gupta (1973)) have responded to this
discrepancy by building two-sex models based on "marriage functions" which ensure the
necessary parity between male and female parents or wedding partners. As applied to
marriages, these models predict that the number of marriages between a female of age i
and a male of age j in year t should depend at least on the number of males and the number
of females present in year t. David McFarland (1972) criticizes these models because they
do not adequately reflect the possibilities for substitution among various cohorts. To allow
these possibilities, the number of marriages between a female of age i and a male of age
j should depend on the numbers of males and females of other ages in the population as
well. McFarland suggests an iterative procedure (which bears an interesting similarity to
the Gale-Shapley model) for dealing with these effects.
Pollak (1985, 1986, 1987) reformulates the "two-sex problem" by replacing the constant
age-specific fertility schedule of the classical theory with two more fundamental relation-
4342
ships. These are a "birth matrix" and a "mating rule." The birth matrix postulates an
expected number of births per period from a marriage of an age i male to an age j fe-
male. The mating rule is a function that determines the number of marriages of type i
males to type j females for all i and j as a function of the vector listing the numbers of
males and females of each age in the population. Pollak shows that if these relationships
remain constant over time and if the mating rule follows certain natural conditions, the
dynamical system so defined will converge to a constant equilibrium growth rate, yielding a
constant equilibrium age structure. Pollak imposes only certain very general conditions on
the mating function such as nonnegativity, homogeneity, continuity, and that the number
of persons of a given age and sex who marry must not exceed the number of persons of
that age and sex in the population.
A Transferable Utility Model Suitable for Empirical Estimation
Pollak's mating rule is a "reduced form" description of the dependence on the outcome of a
marriage market on supplies and demands of the two sexes from various cohorts. Bergstrom
and Lam (1989a, 1989b) construct a model of the marriage market that rationalizes Pollak's
mating rule. Their work concentrates on reconciling the numbers of males and females who
are willing to marry in any given year. In the absence of side-payments, two arbitrarily
selected persons would usually disagree about their preferred wedding date. Suppose, for
example that all males prefer marrying at age 25 and all females prefer marrying at age 23.
A male and a female will agree about the best time for two of them to marry only if the
male was born two years earlier than the female. But in a population where cohort sizes
change over time, there will not always be an equality between the number of females of
one cohort and the number of males of a cohort born two years earlier. If males prefer to
marry at an older age than do females, then if there is a "baby boom", females in the boom
generation will find a shortage of males who want to marry when they do. Males born at
a time when the birth rate is falling will find a shortage of females two years younger, who
will want to marry when these males are 25. When members of one sex and cohort are
in excess supply relative to their "natural partners", there will be readjustments in which
some of the abundant group postpone marriage and some of the scarce group marry earlier
than they otherwise would.
Bergstrom and Lam propose a simple overlapping-generations model of the marriage
market, designed to dealwith this problem. This model has enough special structure so that
its parameters can be empirically estimated. Utility is assumed to be linear in consumption
and quadratic in age at marriage. Utility of a person whose preferred age at marriage is
a* and who consumes c units of consumption good and marries at age a is c - (a - a")
2 .
In the simplest form of this model, suppose that all males have preferred age of marriage
a, and all females have preferred age at marriage a*. Suppose also that the income that
each individual brings to a marriage is independent of whom he or she marries. Suppose
that male i has income I; and was born in year b; while female j has income I; and was
born in year b,. If they marry, they will both have to choose the same date of marriage,
so the date of their marriage is a "household public good". The assumption of quasilinear
utility implies that there is a unique Pareto optimal wedding date for this couple. Given
the quadratic specifications of utility of age at marriage, this date is the midpoint between
the two partners' preferred wedding dates. The preferred wedding date of male i is b; +am,
the preferred wedding date of female j is b, -+ a, and the Pareto optimal date for their
wedding is (b; + a,,)/2 + (b + a))/2.
Let us define d,, to be the number of years that separate the preferred wedding dates
of male i and female j. Then did = |(b, + a)) - (b; + a,,)I = |(b1 - b;) - (a) - a,,)I.
Each partner's actual wedding date will differ from his or her preferred wedding date by
dd /2. The feasible consumption allocations (c,, ci) for this couple must satisfy the equation
c; + cj = I; + Ii. Therefore the couple's the utility possibility frontier is described by the
equation u; + u3 = ail where a,1 = I; + I, - d; /2.
Let the numbers of surviving males and females born in year i be M, and F. The
linear programming assignment model predicts that the pattern of marriages will solve the
following maximization problem: Where Xis represents the number of marriages between
males born in year i and females born in year j, solve for the values of X,, that maximize
E , E, a;1X,; subject to the constraints, E, X,, = F, for all j and F, X,, = M; for
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all i. Since we have assumed that incomes are independent of whom one marries, the
optimizing solution for the X 31's is independent of the distribution of incomes and can be
determined by minimizing F, F, d;X 3, subject to the constraints EI, Xi = F, for all j
and E Xij= Mi for all i.
In the simple model proposed here, the only parameters to be estimated are the pre-
ferred marriage ages a*,, and a) of males and females. Any specification of these parameters
determines the matrix of dig's . This information together with an empirically observed
distribution of age-cohorts by sex will determine an optimal assignment of marriage part-
ners by cohort. Estimation can proceed by choosing the values of a,, and a) that best
predict the patterns of actual marriages. More flexible functional forms and some variation
of preferences among individuals can also be accommodated within this model, in fairly
obvious ways. Bergstrom and Lam (1989a) applied this technique to Swedish historical
data on marriage rates in the 19th and 20th centuries.
Why do Women Marry Older Men?
One of the strongest demographic regularities is the observation that men marry later in life
than women. In a study conducted by the United Nations,
20 the average age of marriage
for males exceeded that for females in each of 90 countries and in every time period studied
between 1950 and 1985. The age difference tends to be larger in traditional societies than
in modern industrial countries and has diminished over time in most industrial countries.
Mark Bagnoli and Bergstrom (1993) proposed an explanation for this difference. They
suggest that, at least in traditional societies, women are valued as marriage partners for
their ability to bear children and manage a household, while men are valued for their ability
to make money. Information about how well a male will perform economically-whether he
is diligent and sober-becomes available at a later age than the relevant information about
how well a female would perform her household roles. This leads to an "intertemporal
lemons model", in which males who expect to do poorly in later life will seek to marry
20 Patterns of First Marriage: timing and Prevalence (1990).
at a relatively young age and males who expect to prosper will postpone marriage until
their success becomes evident to potential marriage partners. Females, on the other hand,
marry relatively early, with more desirable females marrying the successful, older males
who postponed marriage and the less desirable females marrying the young males who
want to marry young. In equilibrium, a young male who attempts to marry is signaling
a lack of confidence in his future economic prospects. While the most desirable females
would not accept such males, the less desirable females have no better alternatives in the
marriage market and hence are willing to marry young males.
This theory implies not only that males tend to marry later in life than females, but
also that males who marry young will tend to be less prosperous in later life than males
who postpone marriage. Bergstrom and Robert Schoeni (1992) investigate the empirical
relationship between age-at-first-marriage and lifetime income, for males and for females.
Using 1980 U.S. Census data, they plot wage income of males in later life as a function of
the age at which they married. Income is highest for those who marry in their late 20's.
Men who marry at age 28 or 29 have average earnings about 20% higher than men who
marry at 18.
III.4 Alternative Household Structures
Most of the work by economists on the theory of the household has concerned either
single-person households or monogamous couples, with or without children. There is,
however, considerable evidence that non-monogamous modes of household organization
are too significant to ignore.
Polygyny in marriage markets
Gary Becker devotes a chapter of his Treatise on the Family to "Polygamy and Monogamy
in marriage markets. Becker's analysis of polygamy is more than a clever curiosum; it ex-
tends methods of economic analysis to a major social institution that has received all too
little attention from economists. Although overt polygamy is rare in our own society, it
is a very common mode of family organization around the world. Polygyny (men having
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multiple wives) is prevalent in 850 of the 1170 societies recorded in Murdock's Ethnographic
Atlas, while official polyandry (women having multiple husbands) is prevalent in only a
handful of societies. Hartung (1982)
One of the first economic issues that must be confronted by a polygynous society is
the question of how are wives allocated. Not surprisingly (to economists at least), the
price system usually comes into play. Becker suggests that theory would predict higher
incomes for women under polygyny than under monogamy. He reasons that relaxing the
constraint that a man can have only one wife would shift the demand schedule for wives
upward, leading to higher bride prices with polygyny than with monogamy. The argument
that polygyny leads to higher bride prices is theoretically compelling and appears to be
supported by anthropological evidence. 21 It does not, however, follow that higher bride
prices imply welfare gains for females. If "property rights" to an unmarried female lie with
her family, it seems plausible that her family would use the proceeds from the sale of a
bride to purchase a wife or an additional wife for one of her male siblings. This theoretical
prediction appears to be strongly supported by anthropological field studies. See Jack
Goody (1973).
Unwed parents
Economic theorists have done little work on extending bargaining models of sexual rela-
tionships and child support to non-cohabiting, unmarried parents. This neglect might have
been excusable on thirty years ago on the grounds that the most children were born into
households with two cohabiting adults. Recent statistics show that unwed parenthood is
no longer rare. In the United States in 1960, only 5% of all births occurred out of wedlock.
In 1990, more than 25% of births were to unwed parents. (About 30% of the unwed parents
in 1990 were cohabiting couples. ) The proportion of all children who live in single-parent,
mother-only households has risen from 8% in 1960 to 23% in 1990. For Black Americans,
21 According to Gaulin and Boster (1990), about 2/3 of the societies found in Murdock's Ethnogrphc
Alas have positive bride prices, while in only about 3% of these societies is it the case that brides must
pay a dowry to the husband. Moreover, according to Gaulin and Boster, almost all of the societies with
dowries are monogamous.
the statistics are even more dramatic. In 1990, two-thirds of births were out of wedlock
and more than half of all children live in single-parent households. 22
Robert Willis (1994) studies some of the interesting theoretical issues that arise in the
analysis of unwed parenthood. Willis begins with an analysis of fertility decisions and
child care expenditures for a single mother who is not able to identify the father(s) of
her children. He then considers an equilibrium model of child support for noncohabiting
parents. In this model, the father's identity is known and both parents care about the well-
being of a child. Since they do not live together, it is difficult for them to monitor each
other's behavior sufficiently to sustain efficient cooperative arrangements for child support.
Willis examines a non-cooperative Stackelberg equilibrium where the mother has custody
of the child and the father can influence expenditure on the child only by transfering income
to the mother. This equilibrium will not in general be efficient. Marriage, Willis argues,
is likely to lead to more efficient, cooperative arrangements for child care between mother
and father. The question arises; If it is more efficient for the two parents of a child to live
together than apart, why is unwed motherhood so common? Willis suggests some possible
reasons. One force for unwed parenthood that leads to a particularly interesting analysis
is imbalance between the number of marriageable women and the number of marriageable
men. This explanation seems particularly compelling for the Black population. William
Julius Wilson (1987) argues that women's search for partners will be confined primarily
to a pool of "marriageable males"-males who would bring resources to a marriage. For
statistical purposes, he identifies this pool with males who are currently employed. Wilson
found that in 1980, the ratio of black marriageable males aged 20-44 to black females
aged 20-44 was about .56 in the Northeast and North Central states of the U.S. (In
1960, this ratio was about .67. ) The corresponding ratio of white marriageable males
to females was about .85. Following Wilson's suggestion, Willis works out an equilibrium
model in which men choose between monogamy and a polygynous life in which they father
children by several women but marry none of them. Monogamous men are confined to
a single mate. A polygynous life will have some advantages because a man may father
22 These statistics and many interesting related facts are reported by Da Vonsa and Rahman (1993).
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children by more women and some disadvantages, including the inefficiencies in child care
arrangements that arise when parents do not live together. In Willis's model, there is
a threshold expected number of partners P such that men will be indifferent between
monogamy and a polygynous life if their expected number of partners in polygyny is equal
to P. Suppose that there are more women who want to have children than the number
of marriageable males available to them, but suppose that there are not enough marriage
females so that every male could have P partners. Then there would be an equilibrium in
which some marriageable males (and an equal number of females) are monogamous and
some marriageable males do not marry, but father children by P different women. As
Willis shows, this model leads to an interesting algebra of a society with a mixture of
monogamy and unofficial polygyny.
IV Interdependent Preferences Within Families
IV.1. Benevolence and other Forms of Unselfishness
Preferences on Allocations
If household members love each other, copy each other, envy each other or annoy each
other, then individuals care not only about their own consumptions, but also about the
consumptions of other members. In the most general case, each member's utility would
depend on the amount of each private good consumed by each member of the household
as well as about the amount of each household public good.
It is often useful to consider a model of household interdependence that is intermediate
between a fully general model of interdependence and the case where consumers care only
about their own consumptions of private goods and the vector of household public goods.
An interesting and much-studied assumption is that preferences on allocations are "weakly
separable" between one's own consumption and that of others. 23 The assumption that
23 A thorough treatment of a variety of separability assumptions is found in Blackorby, Primont and
Russell (1978).
consumer i's preferences are separable with respect to his own consumption means that
i's preferences among alternative bundles (xi, y) of private goods and household public
goods are not changed by changes in the consumption bundles of others. In this case, a
person may care about what other family members consume, but their consumption does
not influence one's preferences about one's own consumption. In this case, each individual
i has a well-defined "private utility function" vd(x, y) that represents i's preferences on
private goods for himself given the vector y of public goods.
In a model with private goods only, Winter (1969) and Bergstrom (1970) define pref-
erences of consumer i to be benevolent (non-malevolent) if there is weak separability and
every family member favors (does not object to) a change in another family member's
consumption that ranks higher in that person's private preferences. If there is benevolence
(non-malevolence), then preferences of every person i can be represented by a utility func-
tion of the Bergson-Samuelson form, U(vi(zi, y),... ,vh(xh, y)). where U, is an increasing
(non-decreasing) function of vi. G. C. Archibald and David Donaldson (1976) define pref-
erences that can be represented by utility functions of the form U(v(xi, y),... , vh(z, y))
where U, is not necessarily monotone increasing in its arguments to be non-paternalistic
preferences. They point out that non-paternalistic preferences permit not only non-
malevolence and benevolence, but also malevolence as well as preferences for equity such
that U, may not be monotonic.
IV.2. Interdependent Utility Functions
When family members love (or hate or envy) each other, their interlinked joys and sor-
rows may feed on each other in curious ways. No matter how these feelings are entwined,
economists concerned with resource allocation are likely to be more interested in derived
"reduced form" preferences over allocations of goods than in a tangle of interrelated pref-
erences about the happiness of others. Therefore, although preferences over household
allocations may be founded on interrelated preferences, economists are likely to want to
disentangle the interrelated utilities of family member and find the corresponding derived
preferences on allocations. This problem has been addressed by several economists, in-
cluding Bergstrom (1971, 1989, 1990), Robert Barro (1974), Becker (1974), David Pearce
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(1983), Miles Kimball (1987) and B. Douglas Bernheim and Oded Stark (1988).
Bergstrom (1989, 1990) studies models in which there is a group of consumers whose
happiness depends on their own consumption and on their perceptions of the happiness of
other members of the group. Then the happiness of each person can only be determined
if one knows the happiness of each of the others. One resolution of this paradoxical
simultaneity is to suppose that each individual's happiness is observable by others, but
with a lag. Each person's current happiness depends on his or her own current consumption
and on her observation of the happiness of all other family members in the previous period.
With this structure, the time path of happiness for each person is determined as a system
of difference equations.
As a concrete exampe, consider a family with h members. Let c,(t) be family member
i's consumption bundle at time t and let U(t) be i's utility at time t. Suppose that utility
interdependence takes the additive form:
U.(t) = u,(c (t)) + EaUj(t - 1),
jii
where the constant ai represents the marginal effect of person j's happiness in the previous
period on person i's current happiness. This system of difference equations can be written
as a matrix equation U(t) = u(c(t)) + AU(1 - 1), where c(t) = (c(t),... , c&(t)), u(c(t)) =
(u (c),... ,u&(c&)), U(t) = (Ui(t),... , U(t)) and A is the matrix with 0's on the diagonal
and with Ail = aij for i #j.
Let us evaluate the path of utilities in the case where each family member receives a
constant consumption over time so that c(t) = c in every period. Suppose that in period
0, family members start with an arbitrary distribution of utilities (U1(0),... , U(0)). If
the eigenvalues of the matrix A all have absolute values less than unity, the distribution of
utilities will converge to a constant vector that we will define to be U(c). This equilibrium
distribution of utilities must satisfy the equation U(c) = (I - A)-u(c). As Pearce (1983),
and Bergstrom (1988) observe, when utility interdependence is nonmalevolent, the matrix
A,, is non-negative and the formal structure of the model is the same as that of Leontief
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input-output matrices. The theory of productive Leontief matrices 24 can be borrowed to
good effect. A non-negative matrix A is said to be productive if there exists some positive
vector x such that (I - A)x is a strictly positive vector. Gale proves the following properties
of productive matrices:
(i) If A is a non-negative, productive matrix, the matrix (I - A)-
1 exists and is non-
negative in every element.
(ii) A non-negative matrix A is productive if and only if all eigenvalues of A are smaller
than 1 in absolute value.
From property (i), it follows that if A is a productive matrix, then where the allocation
c of consumption over time is constant, there must be a unique limiting distribution of
utility U(c) such that U(c) = u(c) + Au(c). Thus U(c) = (I - A)~
1u(c). Writing out in
full, the implied utility functions on allocations, we have U;(c1 ... , ch) = b;;u,(c,)
where bi, > 0 is the ijth element of the matrix (I - A)-1.
The requirement that A be a productive matrix limits the strength of benevolent in-
terdependence. For example, in a two-person family, A will be a productive matrix if and
only if a12a2 1 < 1. Bergstrom (1971, 1989) shows that for two persons, a system of super-
benevolent interdependent utilities in which a12a21 > 1 has the property that at all Pareto
optimal allocations, disagreements between the two persons take the form of each wanting
the other to have the better part. 25 In case there are more than two persons, the matrix A
will be productive if E1 ai1 < 1 for all i. If there is non-malevolence and the matrix A is
not productive, then the dynamical system implied by the equation U(t) = u(c)+AU(t-1)
is not stable. This would imply that starting from certain configurations of utility, although
consumption of each consumer is constant, the interrelated happinesses would feed on each
other and diverge. The dynamics of unstable utility interactions have not as far as I know
24 For an elegant treatment of productive matrices, see David Gale (1960). An equivalent condition is
known as the Hawkins-Simon condition. Yet another equivalent condition is that the matrix I - A be
"dominant diagonal." See McKenzie (1960).
25 Rosa Motzkin and Peter Streufert (1991) present an interesting example in which supersalevolence
leads to paradoxes similar to those induced by superbenevolence.
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been studied by economists.
IV.3. Intergenerational Utility Interdependence
Utility interdependence in families does not begin and end with a single nuclear family.
Everyone's parents were children of parents who were children of parents and so on. 26
Samuelson (1958) pioneered formal modelling of an "overlapping generations" economy,
in which a new generation appears in every time period, and each generation ages and
dies. In Samuelson's model, there is no benevolence between parents and offspring. Each
newborn enters the world, not as a helpless baby, but as a rational decision-maker aware
that she has a specific pattern of endowments of labor to sell over the course of her life. Her
encounters with preceding and subsequent generations are entirely commercial-borrowing
or lending to smooth her lifetime consumption.27
Robert Strotz (1955) argues that individual preferences need not be time-consistent in
the sense that if one makes an optimal lifetime consumption plan from the viewpoint of the
present, one's "future self" may choose not to abide by this plan. In the absence of time-
consistency, Strotz suggests two possible theories of consumer behavior. These theories,
which are clarified and refined by Pollak (1968) and by Blackorby, Primont and Russell
(1978), are known as theories of "naive" strategies and of "sophisticated" strategies. A
person with a naive strategy takes the first step of the intertemporal consumption plan
that is optimal given his current preferences while making the (incorrect) assumption that
in the future he will stick to this plan. In an equilibrium of sophisticated strategies, a
person with intertemporally inconsistent plans chooses his current consumption, knowing
that in the next period, his preferences over the future will not be consistent with his
current preferences. If he knows what these preferences will be, then in equilibrium, each
period's choice will be optimal for that period based on what he knows will be chosen in
26 It is tempting to say that every child will be a parent of children who will be parents, but of of course
not everyone has children. Most economic models of overlapping generations do not, however, take this
fact into account.
27 Peter Diamond (1965) extends this model to allow accumulation of capital and to study the effects of
national debt.
future periods.
As Edwin Phelps and Robert Pollak (1968) and Blackorby, Primont and Russell (1978)
suggest, the Strotz model is a natural starting point for a theory of interaction between
benevolent parents and their descendants. Let cg be the consumption vector of generation
t and tc be the vector (ce, ct+i,...) specifying the consumption of generation t and each
subsequent generation. Then a person in generation t has preferences represented by
a utility function of the form Ut(gc). The Strotz model would allow a member of any
generation t to choose its own c, and to leave an inheritance to its successor generation.
The next generation in turn is allowed to choose its consumption and the inheritance it
leaves to its successor. A mother who follows a naive strategy chooses consumption and
saving based on the (generally incorrect) assumption that her descendants will dispose
of her inheritance in the same way she would wish them to. A mother who follows a
sophisticated strategy chooses her preferred amount of saving in the knowledge that her
daughter will spend her inheritance in a way that is optimal from the daughter's point of
view.
Tjalling Koopmans(1965, 1972) studied conditions on utility functions that guarantee
time-consistency. Where tc is the vector ct,..., c,, of consumption in time periods from t
until the end of the decision-maker's life, Koopmans showed that if preferences are addi-
tively separable between time periods and time consistent, then (subject to some technical
conditions) it must be that preferences of the individual in time t are representable by a
"time-discounted" utility function of the form Us = , M t u(c,). If weak separability
rather than additive separability is assumed and if the time horizon is infinite, then utility
time consistent utility functions take the recursive form Ug(gc) = V(cg, U(e..ic)).
Naive application of single-person intertemporal models to family dynasties lack one
important important feature of modern economic life-the illegality of slavery. It is natural
in a single-consumer model to allow the consumer to borrow on future income, even if he
is not able to commit his future selves to a particular course of action. In the intergener-
ational interpretation, people are allowed to leave positive inheritances, but they are not
allowed to sell the future labor services of their descendants and thus enhance their current
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consumption. John Laitner (1979a, 1979b, 1988, 1990) published a series of papers that
explore bequests, saving and debt in models where parents cannot extract wealth from
their descendants, under various assumptions about mating patterns .
One of the most influential applications of recursive intergenerational utility is Robert
Barro's (1974) paper, "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?". Barro argues that if utility
functions take the form Ug(gc) = V(ct, U(.-ic)) and if each generation voluntarily leaves
an inheritance to its successor, then government programs which impose intergenerational
transfers (for example subsidized education, social security, and government debt) will be
offset by corresponding changes in inheritance.
Barro finds neutrality in a model where reproduction is asexual or the only mating
is between siblings. There are no marriages and no connections between family lines.
Kyle Bagwell and Bernheim (1988) suggest that if Barro's model is to be taken seriously,
then it must also apply in a model with intermarriage between families. Bernheim and
Bagwell argue that if a daughter from one family marries a son from another family and
if both parental families leave inheritance to the bride and groom, then a small income
transfer from one parental family to another would be undone by offsetting changes in the
inheritances of the two sides of the family. But this is only the beginning. If the bride
and groom each have a sibling who marries someone else, then the two families that were
directly linked by marriage will be indirectly linked to a third and fourth family, which in
turn will be linked to other families. Since transfers between directly linked families are
offset by changes in gifts, income transfers between indirectly linked families will likewise
be fully offset, through a chain reaction of changes in gifts along the path of marriages
relating these families.
Bernheim and Bagwell apply simulations and offer corroborating arguments from ran-
dom graph theory to show that with reasonable models of mate selection, there is a very
high probability that any two families in large finite populations will be indirectly linked by
marriage where the links connecting people span only two generations. If it were the case
that for all marriages, both sets of parents-in-law left inheritance to their offspring, then
with very high probability, almost any small governmental income redistribution would
be undone by offsetting private actions. Bernheim and Bagwell find this implausible and
suggest that it is likely that there are large numbers of breaks in the chain, that is instances
where one or both sets of parents-in-law do not leave estates to their children. Where there
are many breaks in the intergenerational chain of giving, Barro's neutrality result can not
be expected to apply.
Laitner (1991) proposes a model in which marriage is not random but strongly as-
sortative on income so that persons who expect large inheritances will marry others who
expect similarly large inheritances. In Laitner's model, the cross-sectional neutrality found
by Bernheim and Bagwell is absent because marriages between children from families of
significantly different income levels are rare and when they do occur, typically the less
wealthy parental family will leave no estate to the young couple.
An economically and mathematically interesting structure arises when each generation
cares not only about its own consumption and the utility of its successor but also about the
utility of its parent generation. Kimball (1987), models "two-sided altruism" by assuming
that preferences of generation t take the additively separable form:
Ut = u(cg) + aU-i + bU,+1
where a and b are positive constants. Kimball was the first to solve this system of inter-
dependent utility functions for the equivalent set of utilities defined over allocations. Hori
and Kanaye (1989) and Hori ((1990) study extensions of the two-sided altruism model to
cases where the interaction are of the non-additively separable form U. = V(U._1, ce, U,+i)-
Bergstrom examines Kimball's model of two-sided altruism within the more general
class of interdependent utilities are expressed by the matrix equation U = u + AU where
A is a non-negative matrix. In the overlapping generations model, there are infinitely
many future generations. This fact threatens to pose formidable mathematical problems.
While many of the fundamental results of finite dimensional linear algebra carry over to
denumerable matrices and vectors, there are some nasty surprises. Among these surprises
are the fact that matrix multiplication is not, in general, associative and the fact that a
matrix may have more than one inverse (For a good exposition of this theory, see Kemeny
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et. al. (1966).) Fortunately, it turns out that denumerable productive matrices are much
better behaved than denumerable matrices in general and in fact share all of the desirable
properties of finite productive matrices (See Bergstrom (1990)).
In Kimball's case, the matrix A has values a everywhere on the first subdiagonal, b
everywhere on the first superdiagonal and zeros everywhere else. It turns out that the
matrix I - A is dominant diagonal if and only if a + b < 1. In this case, the interdependent
utility functions can be untangled by matrix inversion to yield simple, but very interesting
utility functions defined over allocations of consumption. Kimball and Bergstrom both
find that the generation i's utility for an infinite consumption stream over the past and
future is given by:
00 00
Ut = Z:arut-j(ct-.) + ut(cg) + Z13'ut+j(ct+j)
=1 3j=1
where a and 3 are constants, such that 0 < a < 1, 0 < # < 1 and = .
In this formulation, a person born in period t cares not only about her own consumption
and the consumption of her dependents, but also about the consumption of her ancestors.
While it may be true that she can do nothing to change the consumption of her ancestors,
it could be that her preferences about her own consumption and that of her descendants
would be shaped by what had happened to her ancestors. As it happens, preferences on
allocations that are derived from the two-sided altruism model are additively separable
between the consumption of one's ancestors, one's own consumption and that of one's
descendants. Hence for this case, one can study preferences over future generations without
investigating family history. This observation illustrates the usefulness of disentangling
preferences on allocations from preferences on utilities. When one simply looks at the
structure of two-sided altruistic preferences over utilities, it is not obvious without the
mathematics that preferences on allocations will be additively separable across generations.
One might also want to ask whether it is realistic to assume a preference structure that
implies additive separability between one's preferences over the consumption pattern of
ancestors and the consumptions of one's descendants. For example, in some families it
is important not to leave a smaller estate to one's children than has been the norm for
previous generations.
The utility function over allocations that is derived from two-sided altruism implies a
time-consistency property which is an interesting generalization of the Strotz-Koopmans
property. Consider two generations in the same family line, t and t' where t < t'. Gener-
ation I and t' will have identical preferences about the allocation of consumption among
generations that come after t' and about generations that come before t. They will, how-
ever, in general disagree about income transfers among generations in the interval between
t and t'.
Laitner (1988) studies gift and bequest behavior in a model of two-sided altruism where
bequests must be positive and voluntary and where there are random differences in wealth
between generations. As Laitner points out, in reasonable models of intergenerational
preferences, there will be gifts from parents to children if the parents are much richer than
their children and gifts from children to parents if the children are much richer than their
parents, and over some (quite possibly large) intermediate range of relative incomes, there
will not be gifts in either direction.Thus there is a positive (and possibly high) probability,
in any generation, the chain of voluntary gift-giving necessary to sustain neutrality as in
the Barro model or the Bernheim-Bagwell model will be broken.
IV.4. Pareto Optimality of Competitive Equilibrium in Households with Util-
ity Interdependence-The First Welfare Theorem
It is reasonable to ask what kind of decentralized allocation mechanisms can achieve
Pareto efficient allocation in a household. A competitive equilibrium allocation within
the household should certainly be included in any roundup of the usual suspects. But if
there are benevolent consumers, there is in general no reason to expect that competitive
equilibrium is Pareto optimal. If we define competitive equilibrium so as to exclude the
possibility of gifts, then even in a two-person family a competitive equilibrium can fail to
be Pareto optimal. The reason is simply that with benevolence it may be possible for both
donor and recipient to benefit from a gift." 8
25 For example, consider a family with two persons and one good. Utility functions U,(zi, 2) = zi z
and U(zi, z,) = z1zz, where zj is the amount of good consumed by person i. Person 1 has an initial
endowment of 5 units of the private good and person 2 has 1 unit. The initial endowment (6,1) is a
competitive equilibrium, but it is not Pareto optimal, since both persons would prefer the allocation where
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The problem in the previous example could be fixed by extending the notion of com-
petitive equilibrium to allow for voluntary "gifts". This approach is taken in Bergstrom
(1971), who shows that for two-person families, a competitive gift equilibrium is Pareto op-
timal. But for households in which more than one person cares about the consumption of
others, a competitive gift equilibrium in which individuals decide independently how much
to give each other is not Pareto optimal. The reason is that the well-being of someone
who is loved by more than one person becomes a "public good". Purely bilateral gift ar-
rangements will not result in' a Pareto optimal allocation. In such an environment, Pareto
efficiency requires multilateral coordination among those who are benevolent toward the
same individual. Bergstrom (1971) explores a Lindahl equilibrium in which those who
are benevolent toward an individual each pay some share of the cost of that individual's
consumption and all agree on the quantities, given their cost shares.
In Becker's Rotten Kid model (1974), competitive equilibrium with gifts leads to a
Pareto optimal allocation in the household. However, this optimality is purchased with a
very strong assumption. In particular it is assumed that there is one benevolent family
member who makes voluntary gifts to each of the other family members, while no other
family members choose to make gifts. Since by assumption, the head of the family is making
gifts to all other family members, the allocation that results is the household head's favorite
allocation among all allocations which cost no more than total family income.2 9
In an overlapping generations model where each generation has a property right to
its own labor, the assumption that a current household head is willing to make positive
gifts to all future generations is not attractive. But for families in which preferences are
characterized by the recursive structure U, = Ug(c,, U,+i), competitive equilibrium with
voluntary inheritance turns out to be Pareto optimal even if some generations choose
to leave nothing to their successors. I have not seen either a statement or a proof of this
person 1 gets four units and person 2 gets two units.
29 Although in the simplest version of the Rotten Kid theorem, family members other than the head are
assumed to be selfish, the optimality of competitive equilibrium would extend to the case where more than
one family member is benevolent if it is assumed that the utility of the head depends positively on the
overall utility of each family member.
proposition in the literature, but for a family with a finite horizon, proving this proposition
is a fairly easy exercise in backward induction.30 One uses the recursive structure of
preferences to show that if an allocation is at least as good for all family members and
preferred by some family members to a competitive equilbrium, then the total cost of the
proposed allocation to the family dynasty exceeds the total cost of the family's competitive
allocation. The remainder of the proof mimics the Arrow-Debreu proof of the Pareto
optimality of competitive equilibrium.
The Efficiency of Competitive Equilibrium with Non-Benevolence
According to the First Welfare Theorem, under very weak assumptions, a competitive
equilibrium is Pareto optimal for selfish consumers. It seems plausible that this result would
extend to the case of malevolent (or non-benevolent) preferences. Robert Parks (1991)
demonstrates that this conjecture holds for a broad class but not for all non-benevolent
preferences. Where all family members have preferences of the Bergson form
U,(vi (z1)... , v(z.)),
Parks defines the n by n matrix G(vi,..., v.) to be the Jacobean matrix whose ijth element
is 8U;(vi ... , v)/Ov,. He shows that a competitive equilibrium will necessarily be a local
Pareto optimum if the matrix G-1 is a non-negative matrix.31 As Parks observes, in the
case of non-benevolence the off-diagonal elements of G are non-positive and the diagonal
elements are positive. In in addition, this matrix has the dominant diagonal property,
McKenzie (1960), it will be true that G-
1 
is a non-negative matrix.
The matrix G will fail to be dominant diagonal if malevolence is too intense. In this
case, a competitive equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal. Consider for example
30 The proof extends to an infinite horison if there is sufficient "impatience" so that the present value of
resources to appear in the distant future converges to zero.
31 Parks' proof is as follows: A local Pareto improvement is possible only if Gdv > 0 for some vector dv.
If G-
1 
is non-negative, then Gdv > 0 implies dv > 0. But as in the proof of the First Welfare theorem
without externalities, it must be that starting from a competitive equilibrium, there is no feasible change
in allocation for which dv > 0.
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a pure exchange economy with two consumers and one private good and suppose that
free disposal is possible. Each consumer has an initial endowment of 2 units of the good.
Consumer 1 has utility Ui(xi,x2) = XI-Xz and consumer 2 has utility U2 (xi, x2) = X2-zi,
where xi is consumption by consumer i. The no-trade outcome where x1 = x2 = 2 is a
competitive equilibrium. In this case, each consumer has a utility of -2. But this outcome
is evidently not Pareto optimal. For example, if xi = x2 = 1/2, each consumer will have
a utility of 1/4. In this example, the conditions of Parks' theorem fail since the matrix G
turns out not to be dominant diagonal when x1 = X2 = 2.
IV.4. Sustainability of Pareto Optimality as Competitive Equilibria-The Sec-
ond Welfare Theorem
Winter (1969) observed that the Second Welfare Theorem (with convex preferences,
every Pareto optimum can be sustained as a competitive equilibrium) extends without
modification to the case of non-malevolent preferences. This result has an interesting
application to the theory of family consumption because it suggests that in families where
non-malevolence reigns, consumption decisons can be efficiently decentralized by giving
each family member an allowance to spend on personal consumption.
Winter's result, however, is not quite as powerful as it might first appear. Competitive
equilibrium as defined by Winter requires that each family member spend his income only
on himself. A more useful theorem for decentralization in a benevolent family would state
that in a "competitive equilibrium with gifts", where people are allowed to choose their best
combination of personal consumption and money transfers to others, every Pareto optimum
is a competitive equilibrium. But this result is not true without some qualification. For
example, consider the case where Ui(xi, x 2 ) = x 1xz and U2(x1,x 2) = x
2x and consider
the allocation (3, 3), which is Pareto optimal. If no gifts are permitted, then this is a
competitive equilibrium, but if gifts are allowed, person 1 would want to give 1 unit to
person 2 and accept no gifts from her. If person 2 were allowed to choose, she would give
one unit to person 1 and accept nothing from him. Thus there will be no equilibrium
in which each is allowed to determine his or her net gift to the other. We could rescue
the situation by defining a gift equilibrium to be one in which nobody wants to make a
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gift which other persons are willing to accept, or alternatively by assuming that persons
are "selfish enough" so that it never happens that one person wants to make a gift that
the other will not accept. More complicated versions of this problem arise when several
generations have interconnected utility functions. See Bergstrom (1971) or Pearce (1983).
Archibald and Donaldson (1976) show that with certain restrictions, the Second Wel-
fare Theorem extends to non-paternalistic preferences which are not monotonic increasing
in all of the vj's. Their argument is based on the observation that the standard first order
conditions for Pareto optimality in an economy with non-paternalistic preferences require
that individuals all have the same marginal rates of substitution between goods. Given suf-
ficient convexity, and given that the constrained optimality problem determining a Pareto
optimum satisfies the appropriate constraint qualifications so that the standard first or-
der conditions are necessary for Pareto optimality, the Archibald-Donaldson conclusion
follows.
Public Goods and Benefit-Cost Analysis in Benevolent Families
If family members want each other to be happy and if they share some household
public goods, how do we determine a Pareto efficient expenditure on these public goods?
For example, consider a married couple without children who are deciding whether to get
a new car. The price of a new car is $P. Suppose that the husband is willing to pay $H1
for the enjoyment he would get from using the car and $H2 for the enjoyment his wife
would get from using the car. The wife is willing to pay $W1 for the enjoyment she would
get from using the car and $W2 for the enjoyment the husband would get from using the
car. How much should the couple be willing to pay in total for the car?
In the presence of "pure" nonmalevolence, there is a very simple and perhaps surprising
answer to this question. Even though each person is willing to pay something for the other's
enjoyment of the car, they should buy the car if and only if the sum Hl + W1 > P. This
result is an instance of a very general result that also applies to multiperson families and
to cases where the public goods are supplied continuously rather than discretely.
Consider a family with n members where the utility of each household member i can
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be expressed as U(ui(ci,y),... , u,(c5, y)) where c; is the vector of private consumption
goods consumed by i and where y is the vector of household public goods consumed by
the family. The assumption of nonmalevolence means that U; is an increasing function
of u, and a non-decreasing function of uj for all j # i. Therefore if an allocation is
Pareto optimal (in terms of the U;'s), it must be that this allocation would also be Pareto
optimal for an economy of selfish people in which each i has a utility function u1(zi, y).
But this means that any conditions which are necessary conditions for optimality in this
selfish family are also necessary conditions for optimality in the actual benevolently related
family.
For our example of the husband, wife, and car it is easy to see that if P < Hi + W1,
they can achieve a Pareto improvement by buying the car and dividing the costs so that
the husband gives up less than H1 dollars worth of private goods and the wife gives up
less than W1 dollars worth of private goods. Now suppose that P > H1 + W1. Imagine for
the moment that husband and wife are selfish with private utilities ui(ci, y). Then buying
the car would be inefficient in the following sense. For any household allocation that
they could afford if they buy the car, there will be another household allocation in which
they do not buy the car and both of their private utilities will be higher. But since their
preferences are benevolent, the fact that they can improve both of their private utilities
by not buying the car implies that they can both increase the utilities that represent their
benevolent preferences by not buying the car. If the couple were to use a decision rule
such as "Buy the car if P < Hi + W1 + H2 + W2 " they would act inefficiently whenever
P < H1 + W1 + H2 + W2 but Hi + W1 <P.
Where the quantity of public goods is a continuous variable and consumers are selfish,
the fundamental benefit-cost result for efficient supply of public goods in an economy is
the Samuelson first-order condition (Samuelson (1954)) which requires that the sum of all
individuals' marginal rates of substitutions between the public good and their own private
consumption equals the marginal cost of public goods in terms of private goods. Since the
Samuelson condition is a necessary condition for Pareto optimality in the selfish family
where individual preferences are u3(c3, y), and since Pareto efficiency in this selfish family
is necessary for Pareto efficiency in the corresponding benevolent family, the Samuelson
conditions measured from the selfish utility functions must be satisfied in order for there
to be efficiency in the benevolent family.
Although the problem of benefit-cost analysis of household public goods in benevolent
families seems interesting and important, it does not seem to have received much attention
in the literature. The issue does, however, arise fairly frequently in discussions in the public
policy literature about how to value persons' lives. If family members love each other, than
the survival of each is a household public good. Michael Jones-Lee (1991, 1992) has recently
organized and clarified this discussion. According to Jones-Lee, the traditional prescription
for evaluating a public project that saves "statistical lives" is that the evaluation should
include not only people's willingness to pay for their own safety, but the sum of the amounts
people would be willing to pay for improvements in the safety of others.32 As Jones-Lee
points out, Bergstrom (1982) claims this prescription is inappropriate if altruism takes the
form of pure concern for other people's utility. Bergstrom's 1982 argument is essentially
the same as the argument made above for household public goods, but was specialized to
the analysis of risks to life.
Jones-Lee discusses the alternative case of "safety-focussed altruism" in which people's
only concern with the well-being of others is with their survival probabilities. In this case,
he shows that it is appropriate in benefit-cost analysis to add people's willingness to pay
for other people's survival probabilities to their willingness to pay for their own. Jones-Lee
(1992) also suggests a model of interdependent preferences, which he calls paternalistic
preferences, in which each person is "benevolent" towards others, but instead of accepting
the other person's relative valuation of survival probability and wealth, the paternalistic
individual wishes to impose his own relative values on the recipient.
IV.5. Evolutionary Models of Benevolence with the Family
In recent years, evolutionary biologists have developed a body of formal theory of the
32 This prescription is advanced in E.J. Mishan's (1971) classic paper on the evaluation of human life
and safety as well as in papers by L. Needleman (1976), Jones-Lee (1976), and W.K. Viscusi et al (1988).
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amount of altruism that can be expected to emerge among relatives in sexually-reproducing
species. J. B. S. Haldane (1955) remarked that according to evolutionary theory, one should
be prepared to rescue a sibling from drowning if the likelihood of saving the sibling's life is
at least twice the risk to one's own. To induce one to take the same risk for a first cousin,
the likelihood of saving the cousin's life must be at least eight times the risk of drowning
oneself.
William Hamilton's remarkable papers (1964a,b) were the first to work out a formal
justification for Haldane's calculus of altruism. Hamilton's main result has come to be
known as "Hamilton's Rule". Hamilton states his rule as follows:
"The social behavior of a species evolves in such a way that in each distinct behavior-
evoking situation the individual will seem to value his neighbors' fitness against his own
according to the coefficients of relationship appropriate to that situation. "(1964b, p 19.)
According to Hamilton's rule, natural selection will favor genes that lead a creature
to be willing to exchange its own expected number of offspring for those of a relative
so long as c/b < r, where c is the cost of the action in terms of ones own expected
offspring, b is the gain to the relative and r is the "coefficient of relatedness" betweei the
individual and his relative. For diploid, sexually-reproducing species with random mating,
r is 1/2 for offspring and full siblings, 1/4 for grandchildren and half-siblings, 1/8 for great
grandchildren and first cousings, and so on.
Richard Dawkins book The Selfish Gene (1976) popularized Hamilton's theory in a
way that many economists have found accessible and stimulating. Dawkins advocates the
viewpoint that the replicating agent in evolution is the gene rather than the animal. If a
gene carried by one animal is likely to appear in its relatives, then a gene for helping one's
relatives, at least when it is cheap to do so, will prosper relative to genes for totally selfish
behavior. Robert Trivers book Social Evolution (1985) explores numerous applications
of the theory of the evolution of altruism and conflict between relatives. This book is a
-pleasure to read, with a fascinating mixture of theories and applications of the theories
throughout the animal kingdom.
Hamilton's rule is intriguing because it not only predicts a limited degree of altruism
toward relatives, but makes explicit predictions of the degree of altruism as a function
of the degree of relationship. Since the environments that shaped our genes are hidden
in the distant past, most economists are skeptical about the usefulness of evolutionary
hypotheses for explaining human preferences. Still, such fundamental features of family
life as mating, child-rearing, and sibling relations are remarkably similar across existing
cultures33 and are likely not to have changed drastically over the millennia. This suggests
that evolutionary theory can be expected to enrich the economics of the family.34
Trivers (1985) applies the Hamilton theory to parent-offspring conflict and to sibling
rivalry and sibling conflict. According to Hamilton's theory, in a sexually reproducing
diploid species, full siblings (who on average have half of the their genes in common) will
tend to value each other's survival probability half as much as they value their own. Parents
on the other hand, will value the survival probabilities of each offspring equally. Trivers
illustrates these theoretical problems with field observations of feeding conflicts between
mother and offspring and among siblings in several species of birds and mammals.
Hamilton proves his propositions only for environments where costs and benefits are
purely additive. That is, each individual's survival probability can be expressed as a sum of
"gifts" given to or received from relatives. Bergstrom (1992) extends the Hamilton model
as applied to altruism between siblings so as to allow more general interactions in which
benefits and costs from helping others may be non-linear and non-separably interactive.
Bergstrom and Stark (1993) offer a series of models in which altruism between siblings
and neighbors persists under evolutionary pressures. In these models, inheritance may be
either genetic or "cultural."
IV.6. Conscious Choice of Altruism
3s For an anthropologist's view of the near-universality of much family structure, see for example,
Stephens 1963.
3 This view seems to be shared by Gary Becker (1976) and Jack Hirshleifer (1978). Hirshleifer's paper
contains an engaging manifesto on behalf of an evolutionary theory of preference formation.
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When is More Love not a Good Thing?
In evolutionary models, the degree of altruism is selected endogenously by forces of natural
selection. Bernheim and Stark (1988) consider some issues that arise if people are able to
make conscious choices about how much to love others. Choices of this kind are especially
pertinent to courtship and marriage. The metaphor "falling in love" suggests a certain lack
of control of the process, but even here, one has some choice in choosing which precipices
to approach.
Bernheim and Stark find interesting examples in which an increase in love by one
individual may be bad for both the lover and the beloved. They parameterize love as a
particular kind of interdependence of utility functions and show that altering the amount of
love in a relationship can have surprising effects. For example, suppose that one member of
a couple is naturally unhappy. If his partner were to increase her love for him, she would
share his unhappiness and become visibly less happy herself. To make matters worse,
her unhappy beloved would become even more miserable when he observes her reduced
happiness.
Bernheim and Stark find further paradoxes in the application of noncooperative game
theory to people who love each other. Consider two players in a nonzero-sum game.
Suppose that an increase in one person's love is defined as making that person's payoff a
convex combination of his own and his partner's payoff with an increased weight on the
partner's payoff. In the Nash equilibrium for the resulting game, an increase in love may
turn out to decrease rather than increase the payoffs of one or both partners. Bernheim
and Stark also show that increased love may make both parties worse off in multi-stage
games, where an increase in love may eliminate certain punishment strategies as credible
threats and hence result in a Pareto inferior equilibrium.
Maximizers and Imitators
Donald Cox and Oded Stark (1992) suggest that selfish people may choose to be kind
to their aged parents because with some probability this behavior will be "imprinted" on
their own children, who when the time comes will treat their own parents as they saw their
parents treat their grandparents. Parents would then find it in their self-interest to treat
their parents as they would like to be treated themselves when they are old.
As Bergstrom and Stark (1993) remark, it would be incongruous to assume that each
generation rationally selects its own behavior towards its parents while believing that the
behavior of its children is not a maximizing choice, but it predetermined by imprinting.
Bergstrom and Stark suggest a model in which some people turn out to be maximizers
and some to be imitators. Parents who happen to be maximizers do not know for certain
whether their offspring will blindly imitate their behavior or will choose their behavior to
maximize their own self-interest.
For example, consider a model in which an adult couple who are maximizers seek
to maximize an intertemporal expected utility function U(x, y), where z is their action
toward their parents and where y is the action of their children toward them when they
are old. Suppose that the children will turn out to be imitators with probability it and
maximizers with probability 1 - r. Suppose further that the environment is stationary
across generations so that maximizers in any generation have the same utility functions
and face the same probabilities that their children will be maximizers.
If maximizing parents believe that maximizing children will take action y, then they
will choose an action i(y) that maximizes their expected utility,
irU(x, x) + (1 -ir)U(x, y).
Since the environment is assumed to be stationary, if the children happen to be max-
imizers, they will face the same maximization problem as their parents. Therefore the
action y taken by maximizing children will be the same as the action i(y) of maximizing
parents. In equilibrium, maximizers will choose x to maximize iU(x, z) + (1 - ir)U(z,Z)
and in equilibrium it will be true that this maximizing x is equal to s. Imitators, being
imitators, will choose the same 1.
Where the utility function U is differentiable, the first-order necessary condition for
maximizers is Ui(2, ,)+ ±7rU2(2, 2) = 0, where U;(z, y) is the partial derivative of U with
respect to its ith argument. Therefore in equilibrium the marginal cost -U 1(2, a) of
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kindnesses to parents is equal to ir times the marginal utility of kindness received from
their children. Where U is a concave function, it can be demonstrated that the equilibrium
utility of each generation is an increasing function of it so long as it < 1. Thus we have the
paradoxical result that so long as the family produces an occasional maximizer, the more
likely children are to imitate their parents rather than to rationally maximize, the better
off all family members will be.
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